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MARSHA GARRISON*
Abstract
The law's willingness to take account of factors that interfere with
volition tends to vary in accordance with its underlying goals. The
law of wills is dominated by the principle of freedom of testation; it
has thus developed doctrines aimed at detecting coercive influences
that interfere with the testator's free agency. The law of medical
decision making, dominated by the analogous principle of patient
autonomy, has not developed doctrines aimed at detecting coercive
influences despite a large and growing body of evidence showing that
disordered insight and major depression, two common medical
conditions, often have a coercive, negative effect on treatment choice
and compliance. When a patient is afflicted with disordered insight
or major depression, a decision against treatment often stems from
illness instead of the patient's own goals and values.
Current law fails to protect vulnerable patients whose free agency
has been lost to their illnesses. These patients need, and deserve,
protection from the coercive effects of distorted perception and
motivation. The undue-influence and insane-delusion doctrines
developed within the law of wills to detect and disarm coercive
influences are readily adaptable to the medical decision-making
context. There is a wealth of assessment protocols that offer reliable
methods of detecting the influence of depression and insight deficien-
cies.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Research for this Article was supported by
Brooklyn Law School's Faculty Research Fund.
782 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:781
This Article advocates a new approach to patient decision making,
modeled on the law of wills, that assesses voluntariness as well as
competence. This approach is consistent with empirical evidence
about the realities of patient decision making and traditional
accounts of responsibility and moral culpability. It provides patients
with protection against harmful, nonautonomous choices that
current law does not.
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I find no false apprehensions, to work upon mine understand-
ing; and yet ... insensibly the disease prevailes. The disease hath
established a Kingdome, an Empire in mee, and will have
certaine ... secrets of State, by which it will proceed, and not be
bound to declare them.'
The law enforces important choices made by the decision maker
with liberty and capacity, and it holds her responsible for those
choices.2 But when a decision maker lacks liberty or capacity, the
law typically takes a protective stance. This protective policy is
evident throughout our legal system: it supports rules that void the
contract of a minor, the will of a testator subject to undue influence,
and a marriage entered under duress; it underlies civil commitment
statutes, the juvenile justice system, and the insanity defense.
Although the concepts of liberty and capacity pervade our legal
system, we do not have a uniform definition of either concept. Thus
courts have found that the testator's will was void but his marriage
valid,3 and that he was civilly liable but not criminally responsible.4
Such variation reflects divergence in the goals that underlie dif-
ferent areas of law; the law's interest in concepts like freedom and
responsibility "is an interest in enough freedom and responsibility
to satisfy the purposes and interests at hand."5 Variation also
reflects the fact that both coercion and incapacity describe a broad
1. John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND
SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN DONNE 421, 435 (Charles M. Coffin ed., The Modern Library 1952)
(1623).
2. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) ("The contention that an
injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient
notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil." (footnote omitted)); see also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 218 (1968) ("[T]he law of most countries requires that the person
liable to be punished should at the time of his crime have had the capacity to understand
what he is required by the law to do or not to do, to deliberate and to decide what to do, and
to control his conduct in the light of such decisions.... [P]ossession of these [prerequisites] is
very often signified by the expression 'responsible for his actions."').
3. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Kohns, 385 So. 2d 1064, 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Park v.
Park, [1954] P. 112, 113 (U.K.).
4. See, e.g., Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468,469,471 (Conn. 1988); Williams v. Kearbey,
775 P.2d 670, 671 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989). See generally 57 C.J.S. Mental Health § 224 (1992).
5. SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 143 (1990); see also infra Part I.B.
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range of conditions rather than one unvarying state: both the
prisoner and the con artist's victim might say that their actions
were coerced; the unconscious adult and the normal six-year-old
both lack decision-making capacity. Nor are liberty and capacity
necessarily gained, or lost, in one fell swoop. The child progresses
incrementally in her ability to make informed choices, and many
conditions that ultimately destroy liberty or capacity develop slowly,
even insidiously. The victim of dementia, for example, typically
succumbs to her illness in uneven fits and starts that may extend
over decades.'
Although health-care professionals typically diagnose impairment
and make initial competence determinations, courts ultimately
determine whether a particular individual has enough liberty and
capacity to make the decision in question. In making this determi-
nation, courts must place choices that reflect varying levels and
types of impairment into one of two categories: either a decision is
competent and voluntary, or it is not.v
Capacity and coercion determinations present challenges in all
areas of law, but nowhere are these challenges more pressing than
in the field of medical decision making. Individuals with serious
decisional impairments do not necessarily attempt to execute a will
or make a contract, but the fact of serious impairment will typically
ensure the need for health-care choices. These choices may deter-
mine the individual's state of health and even his survival. They
may hinder or advance the medical profession's capacity to test new
treatments for conditions like dementia and mental illness. They
may entail serious consequences for both the individual's family and
the public.
6. See Jane Gross, Living with Alzheimer's Before a Window Closes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2007, at Al (describing various Alzheimer's victims).
7. See Scott Y.H. Kim, When Does Decisional Impairment Become Decisional
Incompetence? Ethical and Methodological Issues in Capacity Research in Schizophrenia, 32
SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. 92, 93 (2006) (describing clinical difficulties in translating capacity
judgments into competence determinations); cf. Elyn R. Saks, Competency To Decide on
Treatment and Research: The MacArthur Capacity Instruments, in 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS
ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY
AFFECT DECISION MAKING CAPACITY 59, 69 (1999), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.
edu/nbac/capacity/volumeii.pdf ("Competency standards are the mechanism bywhich we draw
the line between those who will be permitted to exercise their autonomy and those who will
be treated paternalistically.").
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The current law of medical decision making is ill-equipped to
meet these challenges. When deciding whether to enforce a medical
decision, courts and legislatures have traditionally utilized a
parsimonious approach that looks exclusively at the actor's capacity,
or competence, to make the decision in question; in contrast to the
law of wills and contracts, subjective factors that might undermine
the voluntariness of the actor's choice are not taken into account.8
When the patient accepts beneficial treatment, this parsimonious
approach is warranted; there is no obvious harm when we allow a
patient, autonomous or not, to make a decision that comports with
her medical interests. However, in recent years evidence has
mounted that various common mental conditions often have a
coercive effect that may inhibit the choice of a beneficial treatment.
The parsimonious approach precludes consideration of these
conditions and their impact on the patient's choice.
The parsimonious approach is typically justified on the basis of
patient autonomy, a guiding principle in the law of medical decision
making.9 Patient autonomy undeniably is-and should be-an
important value in medical decision making. But the concept of
autonomy that underlies the parsimonious approach is cramped and
artificial: it is inconsistent with empirical evidence about the
realities of patient decision making;10 it is inconsistent with
traditional accounts of responsibility and moral culpability;1 and it
is inconsistent with principles utilized in analogous areas of law
such as wills and contracts.1 2
8. Courts have awarded patients damages for unauthorized medical treatment and for
medical decisions induced by the physician's failure to disclose significant risks inherent in
a proposed treatment and that produce the undisclosed risk. See sources cited infra notes 68-
71.
9. See MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMYAND SOCIALREGULATION 14-15, 1091-93 (2003); CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE
OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS 3-9 (1998).
10. See, e.g., Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards
of Legal Competence To Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 377 (1996)
(concluding that "the right to make decisions for oneself should not be burdened more than
is absolutely necessary"); Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency To Consent to Treatment,
134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280 (1977) (concluding that a competence test requiring only that
the patient demonstrate "a preference for or against treatment" is "the most respectful of the
autonomy of patient decision making").
11. See generally HART, supra note 2, at 90-105; MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME (1997).
12. See infra Part I.B; see also Leo Katz, Choice, Consent, and Cycling: The Hidden
[Vol. 49:781786
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Despite mounting evidence of its deficiencies, the parsimonious
model continues to dominate the law of medical decision making
and its development. Medical researchers now take this approach
to patient consent as a given, 13 and new, standardized patient-
assessment tools have been based on it. 4 Although there has been
some movement away from the parsimonious model in a couple of
isolated contexts, these developments have not had any impact on
the broader law of medical decision making.'5
In this Article, I argue that the law of medical decision making
should move beyond the parsimonious model by developing volun-
tariness doctrines analogous to those employed in the law of wills,
and I outline principles to guide development of such doctrines. Part
I describes the law of medical decision making; it also compares and
contrasts this body of law with the standards governing decision
enforceability in other areas. Part II explains why the current law
of medical decision making is inadequate to ensure patient auton-
omy and protect the interests of nonautonomous patients. Part III
offers a new approach that is consistent with analogous areas of law
and that reflects the research evidence on patient decision making.
Limitations of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 627,628(2006) ("Consent does not count if coercion
or deception is involved ....").
13. See, e.g., Ruth Cairns et al., Prevalence and Predictors of Mental Incapacity in
Psychiatric In-Patients, 187 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 379, 379 (2005); Dilip V. Jeste et al.,
Magnitude of Impairment in Decisional Capacity in People with Schizophrenia Compared to
Normal Subjects: An Overview, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 121, 121 (2006); Barton Palmer et
al., Assessment of Capacity To Consent to Research Among Older Persons with Schizophrenia,
Alzheimer Disease, or Diabetes Mellitus: Comparison of a 3-Item Questionnaire with a
Comprehensive Standardized Capacity Instrument, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 726, 726
(2005); Luis H. Zayas et al., Capacity-to-Consent in Psychiatric Research: Development and
Preliminary Testing of a Screening Tool, 15 RES. SOC. WORK PRAC. 545, 545 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Laura B. Dunn et al., Assessing Decisional Capacity for Clinical Research or
Treatment: A Review of Instruments, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1323, 1323 (2006) (reviewing and
evaluating twenty-three decisional-capacity assessment instruments and reporting that six
instruments tested only understanding of disclosed information, and that eleven tested
understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and expression of a choice). See generally PAUL S.
APPELBAUM & THOMAS GRIsSO, MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR CLINICAL
RESEARCH (MACCAT-CR) (2001); THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, MACARTHUR
COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR TREATMENT (MACCAT-T) (1998).
15. See infra Part I.C.
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I. COMPETENCE AND COERCION: TRADITIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Competence To Consent: The Law's Consistent Emphasis on
Cognition
1. The Law of Medical Decision Making
Mrs. Rosaria Candura, a seventy-seven-year-old widow with
advanced diabetes, was suffering from gangrene in her right foot
and leg. Her doctors recommended amputation. After vacillation,
Mrs. Candura refused to consent to the operation, and her daughter
filed a guardianship petition seeking authority to consent on her
mother's behalf. The trial court granted the daughter's petition, but
the appellate court reversed.16
Reviewing the evidence, the appellate court noted that Mrs.
Candura
has discussed ... the reasons for her decision: that she has been
unhappy since the death of her husband; that she does not wish
to be a burden to her children; that she does not believe that the
operation will cure her; that she does not wish to live as an
invalid or in a nursing home; and that she does not fear death
but welcomes it. She is discouraged by the failure of the earlier
operations to arrest the advance of the gangrene. 7
The court found that Mrs. Candura was "lucid on some matters
and confused on others."1 " More specifically, it concluded that
"[h]er train of thought sometimes wanders. Her conception of time
is distorted. She is hostile to certain doctors. She is on occasion
defensive and sometimes combative in her responses to question-
ing."19 Based on this evidence of confusion and distorted thinking,
one of two psychiatrists who testified in the trial court found Mrs.
Candura incompetent to make a decision about the proposed
operation.2 °
16. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
17. Id. at 1234.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1234-35.
20. Id. at 1235.
788 [Vol. 49:781
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The appellate court nonetheless determined that Mrs. Candura
was competent to refuse treatment. In its view, the psychiatrist who
found Mrs. Candura incompetent had not established that she was
"incompeten[t] in the legal sense, but rather that her ability to make
a rational choice (by which he means the medically rational choice)
is impaired by the confusion existing in her mind by virtue of her
consideration of irrational and emotional factors."'" The appellate
court concluded that Mrs. Candura was competent "in the legal
sense" despite her confusion, because she "made it clear that she
does not wish to have the operation even though that decision will
in all likelihood lead shortly to her death," and there was "no
indication in any of the testimony that [Mrs. Candura's decision was
not made] ... with full appreciation of the consequences."22
The Candura opinion is representative of the traditional approach
to competence in the law of medical decision making. Although
medical competence statutes vary in their details and emphasis,23
commentators reviewing the standards have found that competence
tests invariably involve one or more of the following elements:
1) ability to communicate a choice;
2) ability to understand the relevant information;
3) ability to appreciate the nature of the situation and its
likely consequences; and
4) ability to manipulate information rationally.24
What these varied tests share is an exclusive focus on cognitive
capacity. A patient may be confused, combative, depressed, or
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Although these statutes exhibit similar themes, their language and emphasis vary
considerably. For example, in Idaho a person is competent to make a health-care decision if
he is "of ordinary intelligence and awareness sufficient for him or her generally to comprehend
the need for, the nature of and the significant risks ordinarily inherent in" the care, IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 39-4503 (2007), while in Oregon he need show only the "ability to make and
communicate health care decisions to health care providers." OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505(13)
(2007).
24. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities To Consent to
Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1635-36 (1988). Many legislative definitions of
competence are sufficiently vague that judges have discretion to decide what elements to use
in determining the competence of specific patients. Those who have reviewed the results of
judicial discretion report that opinions "rarely document which test was used, or what factors
about the patient led to the patient's passing or failing the test." Kevin R. Wolff, Determining
Patient Competency in Treatment Refusal Cases, 24 GA. L. REV. 733, 744 (1990).
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despairing. But if she can accurately describe the treatment choice,
its corollary risks, and its potential benefits to her, she is competent
to consent under all existing standards.25
Using the cognitive approach, courts discount or ignore evidence
that the patient's decision was influenced by his mental state. Thus,
in In re Quackenbush,2" the court discounted expert testimony
that the patient, a seventy-two-year-old recluse who had shunned
medical care for forty years, was suffering from "an organic brain
syndrome with psychotic elements"27 because another expert
testified that the patient "has the mental capacity ... to understand
the risks involved if he consents to [or refuses] the operation,"2 and
the patient "seemed reasonably alert"29 and answered questions
responsively during a visit of "about ten minutes" duration.
Similarly, in McKay v. Bergstadt,31 the court concluded that a
quadriplegic patient "despair[ing] over the prospect of life without
the attentive care, companionship and love of his devoted father"32
and "preoccupied with fear over the quality of his life after [his
father's expected] ... death'"3 was competent to forgo life-sustaining
respirator care because "he understood that the removal of his life
support system would shortly prove fatal."34 And in Bouvia v.
Superior Court,35 the appellate court did not even bother to note the
hospital's claim that the patient whose father and husband had both
25. Thus, in State Department of Human Services v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197,209 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1978), another case involving a limb amputation, the court opined that capacity
"means mental ability to make a rational decision, which includes the ability to perceive,
appreciate all relevant facts and to reach a rational judgment upon such facts." Because the
seventy-two-year-old patient believed that her feet--"shriveled, rotting and stinking'-would
heal without surgery, the court found her "incapable of recognizing facts which would be
obvious to a person of normal perception," and thus incompetent. Id. at 209-10.
26. 383 A.2d 785, 788 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
32. Id. at 620.
33. Id. at 624.
34. Id. at 620; see also State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989) (involving a ventilator-
dependent quadriplegic, in which the State concluded there was no basis for opposing
McAfee's right to refuse treatment).
35. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
790 [Vol. 49:781
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abandoned her was affected by severe depression:3" "If a right
exists," the court opined, "it matters not what 'motivates' its
exercise. We find nothing in the law to suggest the right to refuse
medical treatment may be exercised only if the patient's motives
meet someone else's approval."37
Although the law of medical decision making is clear, there is
considerable evidence that medical personnel who make initial
competence determinations do not always follow its dictates.
Consider this case study, the subject of a recent survey of British
emergency-room physicians:
A 19 year old woman attends the accident and emergency
department. She claims to have taken approximately 20
paracetamol tablets and some 30 amitriptyline tablets about an
hour previously. The recommendations of the local poisons
centre is for immediate gastric lavage and charcoal therapy.
The woman has been brought in by a friend. She has not
vomited. She has no history of deliberate self harm, is not
intoxicated, and is fully alert. She states that her friend con-
vinced her to come and that she still wishes to die.
She expressly refuses any form of investigation or treatment
despite requests from medical and nursing staff as well as her
friend. No other family members are available. 8
Over 40 percent of surveyed physicians stated that they would
"forcibly detain" this patient even if a consulting psychiatrist
concluded that she was "mentally competent." 9 The researchers
disapprovingly exhorted doctors that they simply must learn the
law:
A competent adult patient has the right to withhold consent to
examination, investigation, or treatment even if such a decision
is likely to result in death. This right to self determination takes
36. See GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 261.
37. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306; see also Thor v. Super. Ct., 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
38. T.B. Hassan et al., Managing Patients with Deliberate Self Harm Who Refuse
Treatment in the Accident and Emergency Department, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 107,107 (1999). This
case is not purely hypothetical; 58 percent of British emergency-room physicians who
responded to this fact pattern reported that they had faced from one to ten similar cases in
the previous six months. Id. at 108.
39. Id.
2007]
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priority in law over the duty of care that the doctor feels obliged
to practise. It is essential, therefore, that doctors are able to
assess capacity using established criteria
The researchers added, correctly, that doctors who fail to follow
legal requirements are at risk of legal liability.4
In sum, although doctors do not always follow the law's dictates,
both legal and medical experts agree that patient competence is the
sole criterion for patient choice. They also agree that competence
should be determined based solely on the patient's cognitive
abilities; even the suicidal patient may choose to forgo life-saving
medical care if she can accurately describe the treatment choice, its
corollary risks, and its potential benefits.
2. Competence Determination in Other Areas of Law
The cognitive approach to competence that is employed in the law
of medical decision making is fully consistent with the law govern-
ing competence determination in other contexts. For example, to
make a will, the testator need only have the ability to know:
1) the nature and extent of his property,
2) the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty,
3) the disposition that he is making, and
4) how these elements relate so as to form an orderly
plan for the disposition of his property.42
Thus, in the case of In re Wright Estate,43 although the testator was
frequently drunk, lived in a shack filled with dirt and junk, picked
up garbage and hid it in his house, falsely claimed to own a number
of houses, insisted on buying furniture that was not for sale, offered
kerosene-soaked fish to eat, and failed to speak to his granddaugh-
ter in the street, the court nonetheless found him competent to
make a will:
40. Id. (footnotes omitted).
41. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
42. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRusTs, AND ESTATES 163 (6th
ed. 2000).
43. 60 P.2d 434 (Cal. 1936).
792 [Vol. 49:781
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Testamentary capacity cannot be destroyed by showing a few
isolated acts, foibles, idiosyncrasies, moral or mental irregulari-
ties or departures from the normal unless they directly bear
upon and have influenced the testamentary act.... There is no
evidence that he did not appreciate his relations and obligations
to others, or that he was not mindful of the property which he
possessed.44
An individual may have testamentary capacity even if a guardian
or conservator has been appointed for him.45 An otherwise incompe-
tent individual may execute a valid will if he does so during a lucid
interval.46
Other areas of law apply similar principles. In evaluating the
capacity to marry, "courts generally have limited themselves to in-
quiring whether, at the time of the marriage, the intending spouses
were capable of understanding the nature of the act.' 47 Capacity to
make a contract requires more than a lucid interval, but it similarly
rests on an understanding of the nature of the transaction.48
Throughout the law, competence is determined cognitively, just as
it was in Candura;49 in each case, competence is assessed without
regard to confusion, brain injury, mental illness, or emotional state.
B. Voluntariness: The Law's Inconsistent Efforts To Protect
Against Coercive Influences
In contrast to the law of medical decision making, the law of wills
and contracts does not stop at capacity in determining whether a
decision is binding. Instead, these areas of law consider a range of
factors in an effort to detect decisions that are competent, but
nonetheless nonautonomous due to some form of coercion. Thus the
bride-to-be who is presented with a premarital contract on the eve
of the wedding' and the testator whose bequest was induced by
44. Id. at 438; accord In re Estate of Stitt, 380 P.2d 601 (Ariz. 1963).
45. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 232 (2d ed. 1953).
46. See, e.g., Stitt, 380 P.2d at 601; In re Estate of Gentry, 573 P.2d 322 (Or. Ct. App.
1978); In re Estate of Sorenson, 274 N.W.2d 694 (Wis. 1979).
47. HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 46 (2d ed. 1986).
48. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 456-58 (3d ed. 2004).
49. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
50. See J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
2007] 793
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misrepresentation 5 may both avoid the consequences of their
choices if the court finds that these choices were involuntary.
The law of wills, which is almost exclusively concerned with
effectuating the testator's intentions, has developed the most
expansive doctrines aimed at ferreting out coercive influences that
overcome the decision maker's capacity to make an authentic,
autonomous choice. One such doctrine voids bequests that result
from "undue influence." An influence is undue when it "overcomes
the free agency of the testator, substituting the perpetrator's
volition for that of the testator's."52 If the testator is susceptible to
such an influence and an individual with opportunity exerts
influence that overpowers the testator's will and determines either
a specific bequest or a dispositional plan, all portions of the will
infected by the coercive influence are treated as void.53 Another such
doctrine voids bequests resulting from an "insane delusion," that is,
a false conception of reality,54 for example, a belief-against the
evidence-that the testator's wife is unfaithful,55 that his children
are plotting against him, 6 or that all men are "vicious and contempt-
ible."57
§ 4.03[2] [d] (1989) (summarizing cases).
51. Fraud in the inducement refers to the misrepresentation of facts, for example, whether
a proposed beneficiary is alive. Fraud in the execution refers to a misrepresentation of the
character or contents of the instrument signed by the testator. Most courts require a finding
that the misrepresentation was made with the intent to deceive the testator and for the
purpose of influencing the testamentary disposition as a precondition to striking down the
tainted disposition. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 42, at 213-15.
52. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 221 (1991); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(b) (2003)
(noting that undue influence occurs when a "wrongdoer exerted such influence over the
[testator] that it overcame the [testator's] free will and caused the [testator] to make a
donative transfer that the [testator] would not otherwise have made").
53. The burden of establishing undue influence is on the will contestant, who must show
that "(1) the [testator] was susceptible to undue influence, (2) the alleged [influencer] had
opportunity to exert undue influence [upon the testator], (3) the alleged [influencer] had a
disposition to exert undue influence, and (4) [the will] appear[ed] to be the effect of the undue
influence." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP., supra note 52, at § 8.1(b) cmt. e; see also In re
Estate of Kamesar, 259 N.W.2d 733, 737-38 (Wis. 1977); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note
42, at 143-44.
54. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 42, at 165-66.
55. See In re Honigman's Will, 168 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y. 1960).
56. See In re Estate of Raney, 799 P.2d 986 (Kan. 1990); see also In re Estate of Zielinski,
623 N.Y.S.2d 653 (App. Div. 1995).
57. In re Estate of Strittmatter, 53 A.2d 205, 206 (N.J. 1947).
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Both the undue influence and insane delusion doctrines developed
as equitable remedies aimed at protecting those whose decisional
failings "fell short of total lack of legal capacity":
The "wrong" involved in undue influence ... was the interference
with another's will, which should ideally be free. The test for the
existence of undue influence became the presence or absence of
"free agency," whether or not the individual will had been
"overpowered."58
Similar concerns about free agency are also evident in various
exculpatory doctrines employed by the criminal law; "the doctrines
of duress, provocation, necessity, and self-defense are exculpatory
or mitigating because the actor can explain the criminal act in terms
of unusual exogenous pressures and not moral deficiency."59 Modern
definitions of insanity that look to the defendant's ability to conform
her conduct to the law's dictates are similarly reliant on the
principle that an actor should not be held responsible for acts over
which he had no meaningful control.6 °
Not every area of law has placed the same emphasis on free
agency. The law of torts, for example, evidences a highly ambivalent
approach. Negligence law takes the actor's age and mental state
into account in determining his culpability,61 but the law of inten-
tional torts does not; the mentally ill tort defendant who strikes
the plaintiff based on a delusion that he is under attack is held
accountable for compensatory damages to the same extent as the
defendant who strikes the plaintiff with malice aforethought.62 The
58. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253,
262-63 (1947).
59. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 826
(2003) (footnote omitted). See generally HART, supra note 2, at 28-51, 186-209; Joshua
Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model
Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671 (1988); Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1587 (1994).
60. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985) ("A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.").
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 8-10 (Discussion Draft 1999).
62. See McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Mass. 1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 16, 283B (1965).
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torts approach has been criticized, but it has also been justified
based on a fundamental goal of tort law, that of compensating those
injured through no fault of their own.63
The criminal law also expresses ambivalence about free agency.
Although a number of jurisdictions adopted one or another modern
definition of insanity that takes account of the actor's capacity to
control his conduct, some have since returned to the traditional
cognitive insanity test based on concerns that the modern definition
may negatively affect public safety.64 Similar concerns underlie
the criminal law's frequent willingness to classify as crimes acts to
which the "victim" consented.65
The extent to which different areas of law take account of factors
that interfere with volition thus tends to vary in accordance with
underlying goals. The law of wills is dominated by the principle of
freedom of testation; it is not surprising that it would insistently
take account of factors that might affect the authenticity of the
testator's expressed wishes or that it would develop doctrines
aimed at ferreting out more subtle forms of coercion than those
captured by mainstream notions of force, fraud, and duress. Nor is
it surprising that areas of law concerned with public safety and
victim compensation would evidence more ambivalence about
investigation of mental state.
C. The Law of Medical Decision Making: A Puzzling Exception to
the Dominant Pattern
The law of medical decision making offers a puzzling exception
to the pattern evident in other areas of law. Health care law is
63. See Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927) ("[W]here one of two innocent persons
must suffer a loss, it should be borne by the one who occasioned it."); Gould v. Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Wis. 1996) ("[Wlhere a loss must be borne by one of two
innocent persons, it shall be borne by him who occasioned it, and ... public policy requires the
enforcement of the liability in order that those interested in the estate of the insane person,
as relatives or otherwise, may be under inducement to restrain him...."). See generally Francis
H. Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1924).
64. See HART, supra note 2, at 186-209 (providing a historical account of insanity rules in
Great Britain and describing opposition to modern "capacity to control conduct" definitions
of insanity as based on concerns with shamming and the view that criminal law should be
concerned primarily with crime prevention).
65. See generally 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE
TO OTHERS (1985); Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 231 (2003).
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dominated by the principle of patient autonomy, 66 a principle not
far removed from the ideal of testatory freedom that underlies the
law of wills. Both of these principles focus on effectuating an actor's
authentic intentions, and volition is undeniably a fundamental
aspect of authenticity.6 7 One would thus expect that the law of
medical decision making would have developed a range of doctrines,
like the undue influence and insane delusion rules, aimed at
preventing the enforcement of inauthentic choices.
Certainly, courts have long held that "[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body"68 and, based on this principle, they have
uniformly concluded that the physician who treats the patient
without his consent is liable for battery.69 This is why the British
researchers who surveyed emergency-room physicians warned
doctors who would treat the patient without her consent that they
were at risk of legal liability.v More recently, courts have developed
the doctrine of "informed consent" to protect the patient's right to
make a decision based on accurate information about the risks and
benefits of the procedure in question; a physician's failure to
accurately describe material risks and benefits that the typical
decision maker would rely upon is actionable if the decision maker
can show that he or she detrimentally relied on an erroneous
risk/benefit statement.7 '
Although the informed consent claim takes account of coercive
informational influences, it does not address mental, contextual, or
emotional factors that might overpower the decision maker's will,
like those recognized in the undue-influence and insane-delusion
doctrines. The bioethics literature does stress voluntariness and
"conditions free of coercion and undue influence" as essential
66. See sources cited supra note 9.
67. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 106 (3d ed. 1989) ("Being free to act is sometimes as important for autonomous action
as being competent and being informed.").
68. Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
69. See, e.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 189-90 (Minn. 1958); Mohr
v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14-16 (Minn. 1905). See generally Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal
of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381 (1957).
70. See Hassan et al., supra note 38, at 109.
71. The informed consent claim was pioneered in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-
85 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972). For a detailed account of
informed consent doctrine, see GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 27-96.
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components of autonomous decision making, 72 but the law of
medical decision making has never developed doctrines that take
noninformational forms of coercion and undue influence into
account. The medical decision induced by grief, shock, or despair is
enforceable to the same extent as one induced by a careful appraisal
of the patient's long-term goals and values.
In recent years, there has been some movement toward a more
contextual analysis in two isolated, and very different, contexts. A
few courts have mandated consideration of noncognitive factors
when evaluating the competence of psychotic patients who wish to
decline treatment with antipsychotic drugs. For example, in Rivers
v. Katz, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that competence to
decline anti-psychotic drugs-the only treatment for schizophrenia
and related disorders-should be based not just on "ability to under-
stand the available options" and "cognitive capacity to consider the
relevant factors," but also on
the absence of any interfering pathologic perception or belief,
such as a delusion concerning the decision; ... the absence of any
interfering emotional state, such as severe manic depression,
euphoria or emotional disability; ... the absence of any interfer-
ing pathologic motivational pressure; ... the absence of any
interfering pathologic relationship, such as the conviction of
helpless dependency on another person; [and] ... an awareness
of how others view the decision, the general social attitude
toward the choices and an understanding of his reason for
deviating from that attitude if he does. 3
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the nation's only law
authorizing physician-assisted suicide (PAS), also takes non-
cognitive factors into account. The Act requires the attending
physician to refer for counseling any patient who "may be suffering
from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing
impaired judgment"74 and directs that "[n]o medication to end a
patient's life ... shall be prescribed until the person performing the
72. NATL COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HuMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT 14 (1978); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note
67, at 106-07.
73. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344 n.7 (N.Y. 1986).
74. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (2007).
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counseling determines that the patient is not suffering from a
psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired
judgment. 78
These isolated deviations from the traditional "understanding is
enough" approach have not had any larger impact on the law of
medical decision making, however. Indeed, even with respect to
anti-psychotic drug treatment, many courts continue to utilize
purely cognitive tests in evaluating medication refusals, and a
growing literature on the capacity of psychotic patients to consent
to psychiatric research uniformly assumes that traditional, cognitive
competence tests will be used to determine the participation of
potential research subjects.76
The current law of medical decision making thus exhibits a far
more anemic response to potentially coercive influences than does
the law of wills, or even the law of contracts and marriage. In these
other areas of law, cognitive tests of decision-making capacity are
typically coupled with equitable doctrines that assess a broad
range of factors-physical, informational, emotional, percep-
tual-that might compel the actor's choice. Because the law of
medical decision making assesses only physical and informational
forms of coercion,77 it offers considerably less protection to vulnera-
ble actors.
At first blush, this pattern seems extremely odd. The law of
medical decision making is not centrally, or even peripherally,
concerned with compensation, deterrence, or public safety, the
concerns that justify tort and criminal law's wavering response to
coercive influences. Indeed, quite to the contrary, virtually every
aspect of medical decision making can be, and typically is, analyzed
in terms of patient autonomy. Autonomy has come to play a
"preemptive role" in discourse about patient decision making and
care.
78
75. Id.
76. See generally L.B. Dunn, Capacity to Consent to Research in Schizophrenia: The
Expanding Evidence Base, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 431 (2006) (reviewing studies); supra notes 13-
14.
77. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
78. See Daniel Callahan, Can the Moral Commons Survive Autonomy?, HASTINGS CTR.
RPT., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 41, 41; see also GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 14, 1091-93;
SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 3-9.
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If the law of medical decision making is centrally, preemptively
concerned with autonomy, why has it failed to develop equitable
doctrines like those evident in the law of wills? One explanation is
historical. The autonomy principle that now dominates medical
decision making has achieved prominence only within the past
thirty to forty years.79 In earlier times, doctors typically obfuscated
treatment risks or sugar-coated information about the patient's
medical situation when they felt that such actions had therapeutic
value; sometimes, the evidence suggests, they acted without
obtaining the patient's consent to treatment at all."0 This older
approach, an outgrowth of the Hippocratic injunction to act for the
benefit of the sick, placed less emphasis on the patient's considered
opinion and more on his medical interests. It produced a decision-
making climate in which treatment refusals were rare and litigation
about such refusals even rarer.
A second explanation is practical. Even today, when autonomy is
the central theme in health-care decision making, patients are
highly prone to accept their doctors' treatment advice. 8' This
tendency results from two simple facts: patients typically want to
get better, and patients typically believe they are most likely to get
better when guided by a professional trained in the art of producing
such betterment.
If the patient makes an incompetent or coerced decision that
results in a medically recommended treatment, it is tempting to
ignore evidence of incompetence or coercion. After all, a finding that
a particular decision is incompetent or coerced will lead to the
appointment of a guardian charged with making a decision in the
best interests of the patient," and the best interests of the patient
79. See Eric J. Cassell, The Principles of the Belmont Report Revisited: How Have Respect
for Persons, Beneficence, and Justice Been Applied to Clinical Medicine?, HASTINGS CTR. RPT.,
July-Aug. 2000, at 12, 12-13.
80. See id.
81. Although patients overwhelmingly accept treatment recommendations, they may not
follow through on them. See Buzz McClain, Tell Me Where It Hurts: Doctors and Patients
Often Let Each Other Down, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2007, at F1 (describing national survey
finding that, although 59 percent of doctors said that patients' noncompliance with treatment
recommendations was their "main complaint," most patients said that they "completely
followed" their doctors' recommendations).
82. See cases cited supra notes 26-37.
[Vol. 49:781800
THE EMPIRE OF ILLNESS
will almost always mandate a decision in favor of whatever medical
intervention the doctor has recommended.
We do not know just how many incompetent or coerced decisions
medical professionals accept, but the evidence suggests that the
numbers are substantial. For example, one survey of mental
patients who had "voluntarily" entered inpatient treatment revealed
that 44 percent would not pass a standard cognitive competence
test.83 And researchers who conducted a similar survey of acutely ill
medical inpatients concluded that at least 40 percent lacked
decision-making capacity; clinical teams "rarely" identified these
patients.8
The existence of historical and practical explanations for the
parsimonious approach does not, of course, provide an adequate
justification for its continued use. History and past practice are, as
Justice Holmes put it, only "the first step toward an enlightened
skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth
of those rules." 5 Deliberate reconsideration requires an assessment
of whether the parsimonious approach comports with the current
goals and values of the law of medical decision making. If it does
not, it should be rejected.
II. Is CURRENT LAW ADEQUATE To ENSURE PATIENT AUTONOMY?
A. Possible Justifications for the Parsimonious Approach
One possible justification for the parsimonious approach is
efficiency. We have already seen that medical providers appear to
routinely ignore evidence of incompetence when the patient accepts
a recommended treatment, likely based on an efficiency rationale;
after all, a judicial finding of incompetence will almost certainly
lead, directly or through the appointment of a guardian, to a
decision in favor of the same treatment the patient has already
elected. Extrapolating from this fact, some experts have argued that
83. See B.F. Hoffman & J. Srinivasan, A Study of Competence To Consent to Treatment
in a Psychiatric Hospital, 37 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 179, 181 (1992).
84. See Vanessa Raymont et al., Prevalence of Mental Incapacity in Medical Inpatients and
Associated Risk Factors: Cross-sectional Study, 364 LANCET 1421, 1421 (2004).
85. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE
HOLMES 83 (Max Lerner ed., 1943).
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competence standards themselves should vary based on risk. For
example, the American Psychiatric Association Task Force on
Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization has urged that, for purposes
of voluntary admission to a psychiatric hospital, a patient should be
considered competent whenever he knows that he is entering a
hospital and that release is not automatic:
Under the Task Force's approach, the patient would ... not ...
need to demonstrate an appreciation of the treatment (e.g., a
patient who thought that treatment would be effective because
of interference from ultra-violet light waves emanating from
overhead fixtures may still be considered competent to admit
himself). This minimal standard of competence may be war-
ranted, the APA Task Force argued, because of the low risk of
harm from voluntary hospitalization, particularly when the
patient's choice is confirmed by an independent professional
judgment, as well as society's interest in encouraging individual
choice in this context.'
Expanding on the Task Force's argument, one can make a case for
minimal intervention standards whenever the patient decides in
favor of a recommended medical treatment.87 In such a case, there
is no obvious harm in honoring the patient's nonautonomous
decision, nor is there any obvious reason for undertaking an
elaborate exercise in substitute decision making that will produce
exactly the same result as that which the patient has already
elected.8
The Task Force position also provides an argument in favor of
minimal intervention standards when a proposed treatment offers
86. See Berg et al., supra note 10, at 379.
87. For arguments in favor of this approach, see generally D.W. Brock, Decisionmaking
Competence and Risk, 5 BIOETHICS 105 (1991); Allen Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, Deciding for
Others, 64 MILBANK Q. (SuPP. 2) 17 (1986); Ian Wilks, The Debate over Risk-Related
Standards of Competence, 11 BIOETHICS 413 (1997). For criticism of risk-related competence
standards, see generally Joseph P. DeMarco, Competence and Paternalism, 16 BIOETHICS 231
(2002); M. Parker, Competence by Consequence: Ambiguity and Incoherence in the Law, 25
MED. & L. 1 (2006); M.R. Wicclair, Patient Decision-making Capacity and Risk, 5 BIOETHICS
91 (1991).
88. There is evidence that clinicians take risk factors into account in assessing
competence. See Scott Y.H. Kim et al., Do Clinicians Follow a Risk-sensitive Model of
Capacity-Determination?An Experimental Video Survey, 47 PSYCHOSOMATICS 325,328 (2006).
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only marginal improvement in the patient's condition or itself poses
serious risks. In these cases, too, the chance that the patient's
interests will be seriously harmed is low, and natural variation in
risk aversion and personal values would lead us to expect that
autonomous decision makers will frequently disagree. Indeed, the
doctrine of informed consent is based on the assumption that a
careful risk-benefit analysis will lead many autonomous patients to
elect against treatment.8 9 Such variation enhances the difficulty of
determining which choices are genuinely nonautonomous and of
determining what choice the nonautonomous actor would have
made if he were acting as an autonomous agent.
However, the Task Force approach does not support use of the
parsimonious approach when the patient's decision will result in the
loss of large and fairly certain benefits. Physician-assisted suicide,
one of the cases in which we have seen some movement away from
the parsimonious model, offers a particularly vivid example of such
a case: PAS will invariably shorten the patient's life; it may also
significantly reduce opportunities of both the patient and her family
for sharing and mutually coming to terms with their impending loss.
Antipsychotic drug treatment, the other context in which some
courts have deviated from the parsimonious model, offers another
compelling example of a decision-making context in which non-
treatment risks the loss of substantial, and substantially certain,
benefits. Antipsychotic drugs are the only treatment for schizophre-
nia, and untreated schizophrenia is extraordinarily debilitating and
dangerous. Relatively few untreated schizophrenics can live
independently, and many thus wind up on the streets or behind
bars;9 ° fully half abuse drugs or alcohol, and more than 10 percent
89. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAucHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT (1986); Peter Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 918 (1994).
90. See Johann Brink, Epidemiology of Mental Illness in a Correctional System, 18
CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 536, 536 (2005) ('The prevalence of psychiatric illness in
correctional settings is significantly elevated .... It is estimated that in the USA one in five
incarcerated persons is afflicted with major psychiatric illness; with an estimated 9-10 million
persons imprisoned worldwide ...."); see also Dale E. McNeil et al., Incarceration Associated
with Homelessness, Mental Disorder, and Co-occurring Substance Abuse, 56 PSYCHIATRY SERV.
840, 842-43 (2005) (reporting that 16 percent of episodes of incarceration involved homeless
inmates; in 18 percent of episodes, the inmates had a diagnosis of a mental disorder; 30
percent of the inmates who were homeless had a diagnosis of a mental disorder during one
or more episodes; and 78 percent of the homeless inmates with a severe mental disorder had
co-occurring substance-related disorders).
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succeed in killing themselves. 91 Antipsychotic drugs can enable
most schizophrenic patients to live outside an institution and lead
relatively normal lives. But approximately half of schizophrenic
patients in unsupervised settings fail to take prescribed medica-
tions,92 and delayed or sporadic use of antipsychotics worsens a
schizophrenic patient's prognosis.93 Moreover, accumulating re-
search evidence suggests that medication noncompliance is strongly
associated with the risk of violence toward others.94
Given that decisions in favor of PAS and against antipsychotic
drug treatment have the potential to impose serious harm on the
patient, his family, and, in the case of antipsychotic drug treatment,
the public, it is easy to see why courts and legislatures have begun
to move away from the parsimonious approach in these contexts.
And if PAS and antipsychotic drug treatment were the only
contexts in which nonautonomous decisions typically failed to serve
the patient's best interests, it would make sense to retain the
parsimonious approach along with limited volitional doctrines
tailored specifically to these decision-making contexts. After all, the
doctrines of duress, fraud, insane delusion, and undue influence all
arose in specific, recurring contexts and are tailored to those
contexts.
However, while PAS and antipsychotic drug treatment represent
recurring fact patterns that illustrate the range of serious harms
that may arise from a medical decision, many decisions against
treatment present equivalent risks of serious harm: Mrs. Candura's
91. See Peter J. Weiden et al., Expert Consensus Treatment Guidelines for Schizophrenia,
60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (SuPP. 11) 1, 78 (1999).
92. See Joseph P. McEvoy, The Relationship Between Insight into Psychosis and
Compliance with Medications, in INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 311,325 (Xavier F. Amador & Anthony
S. David eds., 2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 2d ed.] (summarizing research).
93. See Mary Clarke et al., Untreated Illness and Outcome of Psychosis, 189 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 235, 238 (2006) (finding that a longer duration of untreated psychosis was
associated with a significantly poorer functional and symptomatic outcome four years later);
World Fellowship for Schizophrenia & Allied Disorders, New Treatments for Schizophrenia,
http://www.world-schizophrenia.org/publications/02-treatments.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2007) (reporting, based on review of more than twenty different studies, that patients who
started antipsychotic medications within a few months of the first psychotic episode had
significantly fewer relapses and subsequent hospitalizations as well as significantly better
prospects of returning to a healthier lifestyle).
94. See E. Fuller Torrey, The Relationship of Insight to Vwlent Behavior and Stigma, in
INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 2d ed., supra note 92, at 243, 246-47 (reviewing studies).
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decision to forgo surgery shortened her life as surely as would a
decision to undertake PAS; so did Mr. Quackenbush's decision
against amputation, Mr. Bergstadt's decision to forgo respirator
care, Ms. Bouvia's decision to forgo tube feeding, and the lucid
suicide victim's decision to forgo gastric lavage.95 Indeed, because
none of these patients was terminally ill, each nontreatment
decision had the capacity to produce greater loss of life, experience,
and productive existence than would an Oregon PAS decision,
statutorily limited to patients with no more than a six-month life
expectancy.9" If the risks inherent in a nontreatment decision
mandate consideration of coercive influences in the case of PAS, it
would seem that they should also mandate consideration of these
influences in these other cases. Certainly, there is no basis grounded
in potential harm to the patient for distinguishing the case in which
a patient forgoes life-saving treatment from the case in which the
patient elects PAS.
This is not to say that PAS and antipsychotic drug treatment
cannot be distinguished from the general run of medical decisions
that seriously conflict with the patient's medical interests.
Antipsychotic drug treatment appears to protect the public as well
as the patient by reducing the propensity toward violence;97 this
factor alone might justify policies, like those utilized in tort law,
that pay less heed to the voluntariness of an actor's conduct. PAS is
a novel form of medical "care" that many medical ethicists believe
to be fundamentally inconsistent with the physician's ethical
obligation to act for the patient's benefit;98 novelty and uncertain
ethicality arguably mandate special measures to ensure the
authenticity of patient choice.
However, if autonomy is a central goal in the law of health-care
decision making-and for at least thirty years commentators of
every persuasion have uniformly assumed that it is-then the law
should be structured to ensure that all nonautonomous choices
95. See supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
96. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800(1.01)(12) (2005).
97. See Torrey, supra note 94 (summarizing evidence).
98. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL.
L. REV. 857, 881-82 (1992); David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician-assisted Suicide,
335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 663, 663-64 (1996).
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which seriously conflict with the patient's medical interests are not
enforced.
Such an approach would have the additional merit of bringing the
law of medical decision making into conformity with the law of wills,
which is also centrally concerned with effectuating autonomous
choices. Both the undue-influence and insane-delusion doctrines
ignore as harmless a potentially coercive influence when it produces
results consistent with the typical decedent's preference for
immediate family. However, when the testator leaves his assets to
an individual who is not among the "natural objects of his bounty"
as a result of a coercive influence, the bequest is struck down.99
Surely the law of medical decision making should offer equal
protection against coercion. After all, the law of wills protects only
wealth; the law of medical decision making protects health and life
itself.
Of course, there might be practical reasons to eschew a search for
coercive influences. If, for example, genuinely coercive influences
were extremely rare or difficult to detect, the costs of such a search
might well outweigh the potential benefits. A cost-benefit analysis
would also lead us away from an inquiry into coercive influences if
we lacked clear evidence as to the types of influences that are
coercive. But to the extent that there is clear evidence of influences
that are both coercive and readily detectible, the law's focus on
patient autonomy argues strongly in favor of an inquiry into these
influences as a precondition to enforcing a decision that seriously
conflicts with the patient's medical interests.' 0
B. The Evidence: Conditions that Coerce
Although the research evidence is inadequate to make definitive
statements about the range of influences that might coerce signifi-
cant numbers of patient choices, it does identify two fairly common
99. See, e.g., In re Kamesar, 259 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Wis. 1977) (describing "naturalness or
expectedness of the bequest" as an element of the undue-influence claim and noting that "[t]he
fact that the testator has excluded a natural object of his bounty is 'red flag of warning"').
100. Cf. Ken Kress, Why Lack of Insight Should Have a Central Place in Mental Health
Law, in INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 2d ed., supra note 92, at 261-66 (arguing that coerced treatment
should be justified by conditions that are objectively discernible, material, outcome-
independent, and ethically significant and that impaired insight satisfies all these conditions).
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conditions that interfere with freedom of choice and produce
decisions against medical interests.
1. Disordered Insight
The patient with insight can recognize the nature and severity of
her illness, correctly attribute symptoms to that illness, comprehend
the risks and benefits of treatment, and make a treatment choice
based on her personal goals and values. '10 The patient without
insight suffers impairment in one or more of these capacities.
Extreme lack of insight will prevent a patient from passing a
standard, cognitive test of competence. The patient who lacks all
knowledge that she is ill will not be able to demonstrate an
appreciation that the treatment choice is relevant to her own
situation."0 2 Thus, for example, had Mrs. Candura argued that her
gangrenous leg was healthy, the appellate court would almost
certainly have declared her incompetent.
However, insight deficits are often variable and partial. Such a
deficit may manifest itself as:
1. Failure to recognize signs, symptoms, or disease...
2. Misattribution of the source or cause of signs,
symptoms, or disease
3. Failure to appreciate the implausibility of percep-
tual experiences or beliefs
4. Failure to derive appropriate cognitive representa-
tions despite recognition of pathological signs,
symptoms, or disease
5. Inappropriate affective reactions despite recogni-
tion of pathological signs, symptoms, or disease
6. Inappropriate behavioral responses (actions)
despite recognition of pathological signs, symp-
toms, or disease
03
101. See K. William M. Fulford, Completing Kraepelin's Psychopathology: Insight, Delusion,
and the Phenomenology of illness, in INSIGHT AND PSYCHOSIS 47, 47-48 (Xavier F. Amador &
Anthony S. David eds., 1998) [hereinafter INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 1st ed.]; Bonnie L. Rickelman,
Anosognosia in Individuals with Schizophrenia: Toward Recovery of Insight, 25 ISSUES IN
MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 227, 229-30 (2004).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
103. Harold A. Sackeim, Introduction: The Meaning of Insight, in INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 1st
ed., supra note 101, at 3, 8.
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The patient may be aware of some symptoms but not others; her
level of awareness may shift from day to day or even hour to hour;
she may be aware of past but not present illness, or of present
illness but not past; her knowledge of her illness may be divorced
from her emotional response to it.
Insight deficits derive from a variety of causes. They may result
from traumatic brain injury or neurological damage suffered in a
stroke or other vascular accident. 10 4 They often accompany Alzhei-
mer's Disease and other forms of dementia. 105 Insight deficits are
also frequently associated with mental illness. Such disorders are
common among patients suffering from a range of psychiatric
maladies, including substance abuse and bipolar, schizo-affective,
obsessive-compulsive, and eating disorders; 106 they are particularly
prevalent among schizophrenic patients. Researchers have reported
that 60 percent to 90 percent of schizophrenics fail to comprehend
that they are ill and that equal numbers experience nonawareness
of specific symptoms associated with their illness.107 Indeed, in
104. See William B. Barr, Neurobehavioral Disorders ofAwareness, in INSIGHT& PSYCHOSIS
1st ed., supra note 101, at 107-20.
105. See C. Antoine et al., Awareness of Deficits and Anosognosia in Alzheimer's Disease,
30 ENCEPHALE 570 (2004) (reviewing studies of loss of insight in Alzheimer's Disease); Mario
F. Mendez & Jill S. Shapira, Loss of Insight and Functional Neuroimaging in Frontotemporal
Dementia, 17 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 413, 413 (2005) (noting that loss of
insight is diagnostic criterion for frontotemporal dementia and that it is often exhibited as a
lack of concern rather than a lack of awareness); K.P. Rankin et al., Self Awareness and
Personality Change in Dementia, 76 J. NEUROLOGY & NEUROSURGICAL PSYCHIATRY 632, 632,
636-37 (2005) (reporting that loss of insight is a core diagnostic criterion for frontotemporal
dementia while failure to recognize cognitive deficits and unawareness of disease are well
established findings in Alzheimer's Disease).
106. See S. Nassir Ghaemi & Klara J. Rosenquist, Insight in Mood Disorders: An Empirical
and Conceptual Review, in INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 2d ed., supra note 92, at 101-13
(summarizing literature on insight deficits associated with bipolar and other mood disorders);
Thomas F. Cash & Edwin A. Deagle III, The Nature and Extent of Body-Image Disturbances
in Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa: A Meta-Analysis, 22 INT'L J. EATING DISORDERS
107, 108, 116 (1997) (describing insight deficits in the form of distorted body image among
patients with eating disorders); Domenico De Berardis et al., Insight and Alexithymia in Adult
Outpatients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, 255 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL
NEUROSCI. 350, 350, 354 (2005) (describing insight deficits in obsessive-compulsive patients);
Barbara S. McCrady & Donald A. Bux, Jr., Ethical Issues in Informed Consent with Substance
Abusers, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 186, 187, 193 (1999) (describing insight
deficits associated with substance abuse); J. Scott Mizes et al., The Validity of Subjective
Measures of Body Image Disturbance, 5 EATING BEHAV. 55, 56, 64 (2004) (describing insight
deficits in the form of distorted body image among patients with eating disorders).
107. See Xavier F. Amador & Henry Kronengold, The Description and Meaning of Insight
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one survey, only 4 of 102 schizophrenic patients interviewed
reported "at least one negative symptom as a direct manifestation
of mental disease-that is, not secondary to other symptoms or to
medication."'1 8
In the case of disordered insight associated with brain or
neurological injury, imaging studies suggest that impairment is due
to cortical, thalamic, and nerve lesions.1 9 Building on these studies,
medical researchers have more recently found that schizophrenics
also display characteristic neuroanatomic abnormalities and that
higher levels of abnormality are associated with higher levels of
disease pathology and more substantial insight deficits."' Thus,
according to the standard manual for psychiatric assessment, "poor
insight [in schizophrenia] is a manifestation of the illness ...
comparable to the lack of awareness of neurological deficits seen in
stroke ..
Disordered insight appears to be related to impairment in what
neurologists describe as "executive function," which includes
in Psychosis, in INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 2d ed., supra note 92, at 1, 16-18 (summarizing research
and describing studies finding that 60 percent of surveyed schizophrenics displayed moderate
to severe unawareness of having a mental disorder and that between 27 percent and 87
percent of schizophrenics were unaware of specific symptoms); Robert C. Schwartz, The
Relationship Between Insight, Illness and Treatment Outcome in Schizophrenia, 69
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 1, 3 (1998) (reporting that two different studies found that 90 percent of
schizophrenics exhibited poor insight and that almost 60 percent exhibited moderate to severe
lack of insight). Violence among schizophrenics is also significantly correlated with impaired
insight. See Torrey, supra note 94, at 246 (summarizing research).
108. Jean-Paul C.J. Selten et al., The Subjective Experience of Negative Symptoms, in
INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 1st ed., supra note 101, at 78, 85.
109. See Barr, supra note 104, at 112-15.
110. See Frank Larei et al., The Neuropsychology of Insight in Psychiatric and Neurological
Disorders, in INSIGHT AND PSYCHOSIS 2d ed., supra note 92, at 119, 132-33 (summarizing
studies); Brett Shurman et al., Schizophrenia Patients Demonstrate a Distinctive Pattern of
Decision-Making Impairment on the Iowa Gambling Task, 72 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 215, 215
(2005) (reporting that tested schizophrenics "displayed a pattern of compromised decision-
making ... somewhat distinct from that found in (orbitofrontal cortex] lesion patients and that
may be linked to certain clinical symptoms"); Schizophrenia.com, The Neurological Basis for
Impaired Insight in Schizophrenia: A Review of the Research, http://www.schizophrenia.
cominsightbiology.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (reviewing research); see also Laura A.
Flashman et al., Specific Frontal Lobe Subregions Correlated with Unawareness of Illness in
Schizophrenia: A Preliminary Study, 13 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 255, 256
(2001); Matcheri S. Keshavan et al., Correlates of Insight in First Episode Psychosis, 70
SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 187, 190 (2004).
111. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
IV-TR 304 (4th ed. 2000).
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capacities relating to the ability to plan, initiate, sequence, monitor,
and inhibit."2 Like insight itself, executive function appears to
originate in the prefrontal cortex of the brain, and it has been most
extensively studied in patients with brain lesions. Lesions in any
cortical area appear to affect executive control and thereby to
"interfere with intentionality and voluntariness."'1 Although brain
injuries produce the clearest instances of executive dysfunction,
imaging studies have shown neuroanatomic abnormalities associ-
ated with executive dysfunction in the context of many other
illnesses. These include physical disorders such as hypertension,
stroke, and diabetes; 114 various forms of dementia;"1 5 prolongedalcohol or drug abuse;" 6 and psychiatric diseases such as schizo-
112. Jason E. Schillerstrom et al., The Impact of Medical Illness on Executive Function, 46
PSYCHOSOMATICS 508, 511 (2005) (noting that executive function is "associated with a person's
ability to make decisions, their capacity to carry out a plan ....").
113. Anna L. Grimes et al., Informed Consent and Neuroanatomic Correlates of
Intentionality and Voluntariness Among Psychiatric Patients, 51 PSYCHIATRY SERVS. 1561,
1562-63 (2000) ("Lesions in [one] ... pathway may produce a 'dysexecutive' syndrome, in which
thinking becomes disorganized and concrete and the patient has difficulty with abstraction
and with multistep tasks.... Lesions in [another] ... pathway ... result in an 'apathetic'
syndrome, in which patients become passive and often lose all interest in their financial and
personal affairs.... Deficits in [yet another] ... area produce a 'disinhibited' syndrome with
affective lability, insensitivity, tactlessness, and in some cases, unpredictable aggressive
outbursts.... With ... lesions of [multiple cortical regions] .... patients may show 'stimulus-
bound' behavior, in which they are overly affected by environmental cues.").
114. See Dino Muslimovid, Cognitive Profile of Patients with Newly Diagnosed Parkinson
Disease, 65 NEUROLOGY 1239 (2005) (finding that 24 percent of newly diagnosed Parkinson's
Disease patients displayed defective performance on at least three neuropsychological tests
and that the most common deficits were in the domains of memory and executive functions).
115. See Bruce R. Reed et al., Effects of White Matter Lesions and Lacunes on Cortical
Function, 61 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1545, 1545-46 (2004) (describing executive-function
impairments in patients with ischemic vascular dementia and hypothesizing relationship to
brain lesions); Margaret M. Swanberg et al., Executive Dysfunction in Alzheimer Disease, 61
ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 556, 558-59 (2004) (finding that 64 percent of tested AD patients had
executive-function deficits and that less than 30 percent of the variance in performance was
explained by cognitive measures). Among patients reporting memory problems, deficits in
executive function are also strong predictors of conversion to Alzheimer's Disease. See
Matthias H. Tabert et al., Neuropsychological Prediction of Conversion to Alzheimer Disease
in Patients With Mild Cognitive Impairment, 63 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 916 (2006).
116. See Xavier Noel et al., Supervisory Attentional System in Nonamnesic Alcoholic Men,
58 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1152, 1152 (2001); Antonio Verdejo-Garcia & Miguel P6rez-
Garcia, Profile of Executive Deficits in Cocaine and Heroin Polysubstance Users: Common and
Differential Effects on Separate Executive Components, 190 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 517, 517
(2007).
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phrenia and obsessive-compulsive disorder.'17 Indeed, some evidence
suggests that "executive function and attention deficits may be core
features of schizophrenia,""'  which would explain why insight
deficits are so common in this population." 9
Although the origin of insight impairments and their relation-
ship to executive-function deficits are still not fully understood,1
20
insight impairments can be accurately diagnosed. A number of
different assessment tools have been developed, including the Scale
to Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD), the Insight and
Treatment Attitude Questionnaire (ITAQ), and the Beck Cognitive
Insight Scale (BCIS).121 When used by experienced clinicians, many
117. See Robert M. Roth et al., Speed and Accuracy on Tests of Executive Function in
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, 54 BRAIN & COGNITION 263, 263 (2004); Schillerstrom et al.,
supra note 112, at 508; Daniel R. Weinberger & Karen Faith Berman, Speculation on the
Meaning of Cerebral Metabolic Hypofrontality in Schizophrenia, 14 SCHIZOPHRENIABULL. 157,
165 (1988); Kriscinda A. Whitney et al., Comparative Neuropsychological Function in
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder and Schizophrenia With and Without Obsessive-Compulsive
Symptoms, 69 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 75, 81 (2004); Richard H. Workman et al., Clinical and
Ethical Implications of Impaired Executive Control Functions for Patient Autonomy, 51
PSYCHIATRY SERV. 359, 359 (2000).
118. Thomas W. Weickert et al., Cognitive Impairments in Patients with Schizophrenia
Displaying Preserved and Compromised Intellect, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 157, 157
(2000).
119. See generally supra notes 106-07.
120. For example, investigators attempting to correlate impaired insight with specific types
of executive function impairment in a population of schizophrenic patients have reported that
their results "suggest [that] insight may be related to capacities to shift attention between
differing environmental demands, plan ahead, and construct contextual understandings."
Paul H. Lysaker et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia: Associations with Multiple
Assessments of Executive Function, 18 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 516, 516
(2006); see also Paul H. Lysaker et al., Insight in Schizophrenia: Associations with Executive
Function and Coping Style, 59 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 41, 41-42 (2003). But schizophrenic
patients may exhibit serious insight deficits in the absence of executive-function impairment.
See Paul H. Lysaker et al., Patterns of Neurocognitive Deficits and Unawareness of Illness in
Schizophrenia, 191 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 38, 38-39 (2003); see also Somaia
Mohamed et al., Insight in Schizophrenia.: Its Relationship to Measures of Executive Functions,
187 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 525, 525 (1999) (finding that unawareness of negative,
but not positive, symptoms is associated with executive functioning in individuals with
chronic schizophrenia); Kevin D. Morgan & Anthony S. David, Neuropsychological Studies of
Insight in Patients with Psychotic Disorders, in INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 2d ed., supra note 92,
at 177, 189 (summarizing evidence on insight-cognition studies and concluding that the
evidence suggests that "good insight is at least partially dependent on intact frontal-executive
functioning").
121. See Xavier F. Amador et al., Assessment of Insight in Psychosis, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
873 (1993); Amador & Kronengold, supra note 107, at 5-13 (describing and comparing insight
assessment instruments); Aaron T. Beck et al., A New Instrument for Measuring Insight: The
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of these scales produce reasonably consistent results, 22 even across
national borders and cultural boundaries.
121
The available evidence uniformly suggests that disordered insight
enhances the likelihood of a decision against treatment. A number
of studies have found that psychotic patients who are involuntarily
hospitalized have significantly lower insight scores than patients
who voluntarily enter the hospital for treatment. 124 Similarly,
anorectic patients, "[d]espite clear understanding of the benefits of
treatment and a wish to recover," often experience "difficulties
making a decision to change their behaviour or accept treatment"
due to their powerful urge to control a body that seems, to the ill
patient, much larger than it really is.
125
Disordered insight is also associated with treatment noncompli-
ance. Among schizophrenics, for example, a number of studies
have found that patients who exhibit deficits in one or another
aspect of insight are less likely to be medication-compliant and more
likely to require hospitalization. 26 Researchers have found a similar
Beck Cognitive Insight Scale, 68 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 319 (2004); Morgan & David, supra
note 120, at 177, 184-86. See generally ESTHER STRAUSS ET AL., A COMPENDIUM OF
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS: ADMINISTRATION, NORMS, AND COMMENTARY (3d ed. 2006).
122. See M. Sanz et al., A Comparative Study of Insight Scales and Their Relationship to
Psychopathological and Clinical Variables, 28 PSYCHOLOGICAL MED. 437,437 (1998). However,
the results of self-assessment tools appear to deviate from those produced by clinician-
assessment tools when clinician assessment precedes self-assessment. See Diana M.
Jovanovski et al., A Comparison Between a Researcher-rated and a Self-report Method of
Insight Assessment in Chronic Schizophrenia Revisited. A Replication Study Using the SUMD
and SAIQ, 195 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 165, 166 (2007). Some scales also tend to show
correlation between insight and IQ while others do not. See Morgan & David, supra note 120,
at 184.
123. See Anthony S. David, The Clinical Importance of Insight: An Overview, in INSIGHT &
PSYCHOSIS 2d ed., supra note 92, at 359, 366-67 (summarizing studies).
124. See id. at 377-79 (summarizing studies).
125. Jacinta Tan et al., Competence To Refuse Treatment in Anorexia Nervosa, 26 INTVL J.
L. & PSYCHIATRY 697, 703 (2003) [hereinafter Tan et al., Competence].
126. See Tania M. Lincoln et al., Correlates and Long-Term Consequences of Poor Insight
in Patients With Schizophrenia: A Systematic Review, 33 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL, 324 (Nov.
2007) (reviewing studies); McEvoy, supra note 92, at 311, 315-18; see also Jennifer C. Day et
al., Attitudes Toward Antipsychotic Medication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 717, 717
(2005); T. Droulot, Relationships Between Insight and Medication Adherence in Subjects with
Psychosis, 29 ENCEPHALE 430 (2005). The relationship between insight and symptom severity
is unclear. One recent meta-analysis of more than forty studies found a "small [but
statistically significant] negative relationship between insight and global, positive and
negative symptoms," but the symptoms described only 3-7 percent of the variance. Alisa R.
Mintz et al., Insight in Schizophrenia:A Meta-Analysis, 61 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 75,75 (2003);
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correlation between insight and medication compliance among
psychotic patients generally. 127 Executive-function deficits that have
not evolved into a full-blown insight disorder are also a significant
risk factor for harm resulting from self neglect, 12  resistance to
medical care, and noncompliance with medication regimes.'29
Perhaps because poor insight predicts treatment noncompliance,
insight is also significantly linked, for many illnesses, with long-
term medical prognosis. Insight scores offer a reliable means of
predicting which patients with first episodes of many psychotic
disorders will relapse and require hospital readmission. 3 ° Similarly,
among patients with eating disorders, greater disturbance in body
image is associated with a higher likelihood of post-remission
relapse.''
Although the research literature is relatively sparse, it appears
that restoration of insight frequently alters treatment choices.'32
Psychotic patients who gain insight are more likely to be med-
ication-compliant than those who do not.'33 Researchers studying
patients with both psychotic illnesses 34 and eating disorders who
see also Day, supra, at 723.
127. See M. Nos6 et al., How Often Do Patients with Psychosis Fail To Adhere to Treatment
Programmes? A Systematic Review, 33 PSYCHOL. MED. 1149, 1149 (2003) (reviewing studies
and concluding that about one in four psychotic patients is medication nonadherent).
128. See Leo M. Cooney et al., Who Can Stay at Home?: Assessing the Capacity To Choose
To Live in the Community, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 357, 357 (2004); Mary C. Tierney
et al., Neuropsychological Predictors of Self-Neglect in Cognitively Impaired Older People Who
Live Alone, 15 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 140, 146 (2007).
129. See Schillerstrom et al., supra note 112, at 509.
130. See David, supra note 123, at 378-79 tbl.18.2 (summarizing studies); Richard J. Drake
et al., Insight as a Predictor of the Outcome of First-Episode Nonaffective Psychosis in a
Prospective Cohort Study in England, 68 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 81, 81 (2007) (finding
significant correlation); see also Daniela Simon et al., Depressed Patients' Perceptions of
Depression Treatment Decision-Making, 10 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 62,62 (2007) (finding that
"lack of insight regarding depression severity substantially delayed patient engagement in
treatment seeking and decision-making").
131. See Pamela K. Keel et al., Postremission Predictors of Relapse in Women With Eating
Disorders, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2263, 2263 (2005).
132. See Sharon Riordan & Martin Humphreys, Patient Perceptions of Medium Secure
Care, 47 MED. SCI. & L. 20, 20 (2007) (reporting that psychiatric patients in "medium secure"
care typically "felt the advantages of hospital care compensated for the disadvantages,
particularly as their mental state stabilised and they gained insight into their illness").
133. See David, supra note 123, at 373-74 (reviewing studies); McEvoy, supra note 92, at
326-27 (same).
134. See William Gardner et al., Patients' Revisions of Their Beliefs About the Need for
Hospitalization, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1385, 1385 (1999); W. M. Greenberg et al., Patients'
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were involuntarily hospitalized for treatment have found that "the
majority ... later affirmed the necessity of their treatment and
showed goodwill toward the treatment process.""1 5
Patients with severely impaired insight often pass standard
competence tests, however. For example, in one recent study, 57
percent of subjects with diagnosed schizophrenia or schizo-affective
disorder passed the "most stringent" version of a widely used,
standardized competence test and 92 percent passed the 'least
stringent" version.36 In another study which assessed capacity for
research participation, fully 80 percent of schizophrenic subjects
were deemed competent, under the same standardized test, to
consent to a hypothetical drug trial."17
At first glance, these results are extremely odd. After all,
competence assessment has typically been thought to require
assessment of the patient's appreciation of treatment risks and
benefits.'38 Indeed, the Candura court deemed Mrs. Candura
competent to forgo treatment precisely because she had "made it
clear that she does not wish to have the operation even though that
decision will in all likelihood lead shortly to her death" and there
was "no indication in any of the testimony that [Mrs. Candura's
decision was not made] ... with full appreciation of the conse-
Attitudes Toward Having Been Forcibly Medicated, 24 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 513,
518 (1996) (finding that 60 percent of patients retrospectively thought forced medication was
a good idea).
135. Tureka L. Watson et al., Involuntary Treatment of Eating Disorders, 157 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1806, 1806 (2000); see also Terry Carney et al., Institutional Options in
Management of Coercion in Anorexia Treatment: The Antipodean Experiment?, 26 INT'L J.L.
& PSYCHIATRY 647,650 (2003) (finding that patients involuntarily coerced into treatment may
progress at a slower rate, but would not have opted for treatment otherwise); Tan et al.,
Competence, supra note 125, at 702-04 (finding that some patients suffering from anorexia
nervosa have an appreciation for treatment, but do not wish to undergo treatment).
136. Laura B. Dunn et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Adequate Performance on a
Measure of Abilities Related to Decisional Capacity: Differences Among Three Standards for
the MacCAT-CR in Patients with Schizophrenia, 89 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 110, 110 (2007); see
also Cairns et al., supra note 13, at 380 (finding that 56 percent of psychotic inpatients were
competent); Jeste et al., supra note 13, at 126 (reporting that, in twelve different studies
determining the capacity of schizophrenics, 48 to 90 percent of subjects did not have impaired
capacity); Palmer et al., supra note 13, at 731-32; Zayas et al., supra note 13, at 551 (reporting
that 93 percent of schizophrenic outpatients passed cognitively-based competence test).
137. See David J. Moser et al., Capacity To Provide Informed Consent for Participation in
Schizophrenia and HIVResearch, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1201, 1203-04 (2002).
138. See Dunn et al., supra note 14, at 1323.
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quences.""' 9 Moreover, standardized competence tests do require
an inquiry into the patient's understanding of both her condition
and the proposed treatment's risks and benefits.14 ° For example,
the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment
(MacCAT-T)-the test actually used in the schizophrenia research
described in the last paragraph and in virtually all of the reported
studies "-requires the patient to "acknowledge[] that he or she
manifests the disclosed disorder[] and all or most of the disclosed
symptoms" in order to obtain the highest score on the disorder-
appreciation scale; similarly, the patient must "acknowledge[] at
least some potential for the treatment to produce some benefit" and
offer a reason that is "not based on a delusional premise or a serious
distortion of reality" in order to obtain a full score on the treatment-
appreciation scale.' 42
Given the assessment criteria of the MacCAT-T and the fact that
most schizophrenics have significant insight deficits, one would
think that evaluators are somehow misusing the MacCAT-T
assessment protocols when they pass the vast majority of schizo-
phrenic patients. However, comparative surveys have shown that
the MacCAT-T tends to produce highly consistent results when used
by different clinicians. 4 ' Moreover, the researchers who developed
the MacCAT-T test report that, in their own research with schizo-
phrenic patients, 78 percent of test takers received full credit on
both appreciation scales and 90 percent received full credit on the
treatment-appreciation scale.'44 Researchers have also found that
subject performance on the MacCAT-T is not significantly correlated
with the subject's underlying level of psychopathology.' 45 Clearly,
139. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976).
140. Dunn et al., supra note 14, at 1323.
141. Id. (reviewing range of competence assessment instruments and reporting that the
MacArthur scale has "the most empirical support").
142. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, MAcCAT-T, supra note 14, at 15-16.
143. Ruth Cairns et al., Reliability of Mental Capacity Assessments in Psychiatric In-
Patients, 187 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 372, 376 (2005).
144. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, MAcCAT-T, supra note 14, at 31 tbl.3.
145. But see Jeffrey A. Kovnick et al., Competence To Consent to Research Among Long-Stay
Inpatients with Chronic Schizophrenia, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1247, 1247 (2003) (finding that
"degree of psychopathology and cognitive functioning were significantly negatively correlated
with understanding and appreciation ... [in studied schizophrenic patients and that] [length
of hospitalization was significantly negatively correlated with all measures of decision-making
capacity"); Scott Stroup et al., Decision-Making Capacity for Research Participation Among
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something more than misapplication is at work here. It is also
important to note that the MacCAT-T does not produce results
markedly different from those produced by other competence
tests;146 researchers have reported a very high degree of outcome-
correspondence using various standardized competence-assessment
tools.14
7
The question remains, however: If 60 to 90 percent of schizo-
phrenic patients fail to comprehend that they are ill, and equivalent
numbers fail to attribute one or more symptoms to their illness, how
could almost 80 percent sail through the appreciation component of
the MacCAT-T (or another standardized competence) test with full
credit? There are no published studies analyzing this extraordi-
narily interesting and important question, but comparison of the
MacCAT-T test and the Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental
Disorder (SUMD), the most widely used insight-assessment scale,
suggests that the explanation probably lies in varying assessment
procedures.
The MacCAT-T assessment is conducted informally based on a
brief, nonstandardized interview.14 The interviewer is directed to
"use whatever approach to questioning is comfortable"'149 and to
assess appreciation of the underlying disorder based on an inquiry
such as this proffered example: "Now that is what your doctors ...
think is the problem in your case. If you have any reason to doubt
that, I'd like you to tell me so. What do you think?""15 If the patient
"expresses disagreement with the diagnosis or features of the
disorder as applied to himself' the clinician is directed to "determine
through discussion the basis for the disbelief." '' But if the patient
Individuals in the CATIE Schizophrenia Trial, 80 SCHIZOPHRENIARES. 1, 1-2 (2005) (reporting
that "in multiple regression models predicting performance on the MacCAT-CR scales,
working memory was the only consistent predictor of the components of decision-making
capacity").
146. See Vanessa Raymont, The Inter-rater Reliability of Mental Capacity Assessments, 30
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 112, 116 (2007) (finding similar patterns of consistency in the
MacCAT-T and the Thinking Rationally About Treatment (TRAT) tests).
147. Id. ("[E]xperienced psychiatrists and psychologists are able to make reasonably
consistent judgements, despite a heterogenous clinical population with diverse medical
disorders.").
148. GRisso & APPELBAUM, MACCAT-T, supra note 14, at 7.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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agrees, the test manual requires no further inquiry. 52 Similarly, in
assessing treatment-appreciation, the interviewer is directed to
determine "whether the patient acknowledges that the proposed
treatment might be of some benefit and, if not, ... the patient's
explanations and reasons for disbelieving that treatment might
have some benefit in his or her own situation." '153 The manual notes
that the point of this line of questioning "is not ... to determine
whether the patient is accepting the treatment" but instead to
"determine whether the patient is unwilling even to consider
(acknowledge the possibility of) the treatment because of confused,
delusional, or affective states related to mental disorder. 154
By contrast, the SUMD involves a semi-structured interview that
"evaluates insight as a multidimensional phenomenon" based on a
seventy-two-item questionnaire; each item is rated on a five-point
scale: "'55 "the SUMD allows for the independent assessment of
current and retrospective awareness of having a mental disorder,
awareness of particular signs and symptoms, benefit from treat-
ment, and the psychosocial consequences of having a mental
disorder."'5 6 Although the SUMD does not rate beliefs about
whether treatment is needed, it does provide a "detailed assessment
of patients' awareness of, and attribution for, a wide range of signs
and symptoms.'
' 57
It would be useful to have interview transcripts or other detailed
comparative accounts to get a fuller comparative picture of the
MacCAT-T and SUMD assessment processes, but I could find none
in the research literature. However, a recent series of articles does
offer a richly textured account of competence assessment in a small
group of anorectic patients. Despite the fact that "the majority [of
these patients] ... had significant levels of psychopathology" and two
"did not fully accept that they suffered from anorexia nervosa
despite having good understanding and reasoning,"'5 8 all passed the
152. Id.
153. Id. at 8.
154. Id.
155. Amador & Kronengold, supra note 107, at 11.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Tan et al., Competence, supra note 125, at 701; see also Jacinta Tan et al., Anorexia
Nervosa and Personal Identity: The Accounts of Patients and Their Parents, 26 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 533, 538 (2004) [hereinafter Tan et al., Personal Identity]; Jacinta Tan et al.,
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MacCAT-T at "a high standard ... comparable to [that of a] ...
healthy population control group in a previous study using the
MacCAT-T. '159 Although the researchers do not provide full
transcripts of the competence-assessment interviews, they do offer
substantial excerpts.
These excerpts reveal, first of all, that the participants' knowledge
of their disorder was largely irrelevant to their feelings about
treatment. This gap between information and emotional response
appears to derive from the fact that, for these anorectic patients,
their illness had come to represent a core part of their personal
identities:
"It's awful to admit, but in general it's [the anorexia
nervosa] the most important thing in my life.... In compari-
son with relationships, it's much more important than that,
with university and work it's a difficult decision, but as it
goes I can't say anything but that I did drop my university
and that I was in pursuit of thinness at the time. And even
now if I were given the opportunity to go back [to univer-
sity] now but I'd have to be a lot heavier, I'd say no."
(Participant C) ....
Interviewer: If your anorexia nervosa magically disappeared,
what would be different from right now?
"Everything. My personality would be different. It's been,
I know it's been such a big part of me, and-I don't think
you can ever get rid of it, or the feelings, you always have
a bit in you." (Participant I)
Interviewer: What does being thin achieve for you?
"People would like you more, it's just all I want to be."
Interviewer: So if you achieve that, what kind of person would
you be?
Control and Compulsory Treatment in Anorexia Nervosa: The Views of Patients and Parents,
26 IN'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 627, 627-43 (2003) [hereinafter Tan et al., Control] (finding that
those suffering from anorexia nervosa have trouble accepting treatment, even though they
understand the consequences of refusing treatment).
159. Tan et al., Competence, supra note 125, at 704; see also id. at 701 ("In the category of
'understanding,' participants had a median score of 6.0 out of a maximum of 6.0. In the
category of 'appreciation of illness,' the participants had a median score of 4.0 out of a
maximum possible score of 4.0. In the category of 'reasoning,' the participants had a median
score of 6.0 out of a maximum of 8.0. These scores reflected the excellent performance of the
participants in the MacCAT-T task.").
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"I'd be much happier, and people would like me more."
(Participant B). 16
Identification with their disorder was so powerful that, for some of
the interviewees, the risk of dying had become comparatively
unimportant: "Although I didn't mind dying, I really didn't want to,
it's just I wanted to lose weight, that was the main thing. (Partici-
pant I)."1'1 Thus, "[d]espite clear understanding of the benefits of
treatment and a wish to recover," '162 some patients were highly
ambivalent about their doctors' recommendations:
"I couldn't stop [dieting]. Don't want to and couldn't any-
way." (Participant B)
"As much as I want to get over it [anorexia nervosa], every
time I come to eat I just can't, I think, I dream about when
I can go running and I think, if only I could just manage to
eat everything, and then I will, but when it comes to it I
just can't face it." (Participant H)"'6
In sum, many of these anorectic research subjects had placed
their lives and selves in the service of their illness. Although fully
aware that they were ill and that the treatment they had been
offered could provide medical benefits, they continued to want the
distorted experience and opportunities for control that anorexia had
given them.
The patients who were interviewed were all in active treatment.
Some of them had thus begun to achieve some measure of insight
into their situation. For example, one participant told the inter-
viewer:
"I remember getting some tests back saying how my liver was
really damaged and all this, and I thought it was really rather
good! I can't imagine that I thought it, it felt like really quite an
160. Id.; see also Tan et al., Personal Identity, supra note 158, at 539-40 (showing that
patients suffering from anorexia nervosa incorporate the disease into their personalities in
different ways).
161. Tan et al., Competence, supra note 125, at 702.
162. Id. at 703. The researchers also report that all the study participants were "highly
conversant with the facts of their disorder ...." Id. at 704.
163. Id.
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accomplishment! It was just I'd just done something that I knew
hardly anyone else could do." (Participant D)1"
In a similar vein, another participant was able to recognize and
describe the disconnection between her knowledge and her feelings:
Interviewer: ... So there are two alternatives, really, the treat-
ment package and not having treatment. Which of the two seems
the best to you? (4 second silence)
Interviewer: Which one are you most likely to want? (2 second
silence)
"I'm most likely to want nothing, but I don't think that
would help."
Interviewer: Right, so they are two different questions, which is
best and which do you want.
'Mm." (Agreement)
Interviewer: So in the end, if I were sitting here and I was your
doctor, which would you choose, do you think?
"Nothing."
Interviewer: No treatment.
'No."
Interviewer: Okay. And which do you actually think is better?
"The package, the treatment." (Participant I)165
Despite these insight gains, the interview data show frequent
lapses in accurate self-appraisal. Even though some of the respon-
dent patients were on the road to recovery, their illness continued
to exert a powerful, perhaps coercive, grip on their attitudes toward
treatment. When such a patient says "no treatment," it thus may be
"the anorexia talking" instead of the patient's authentic goals and
values. 166
Although the survey I have just described was small, it reveals a
central feature of being anorectic or bulimic: "Anorexia nervosa and
bulimia nervosa are united by a distinctive core psychopathology ...;
patients overevaluate their shape and weight ... [; they] judge their
self-worth largely, or even exclusively, in terms of their shape and
164. Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 704.
166. Jacinta Tan, The Anorexia Talking?, 362 LANCET 1246, 1246 (2003).
820 [Vol. 49:781
THE EMPIRE OF ILLNESS
weight and their ability to control them.' 67 It is thus likely that the
research subjects were typical, and that the MacCAT-T's failure to
reveal or take into account the research subjects' distorted body
images and lack of insight into those distortions would be replicated
in a larger population. Other anorectic patients could also pass the
appreciation component of the MacCAT-T, like the research subjects
undoubtedly did, simply by not expressing "any reason to doubt" the
anorexia diagnosis and admitting that the treatment "might be of
some benefit.""16
Based on their test results and interview data, the authors of the
anorexia study concluded that current methods of assessing capacity
to refuse treatment were "inadequate to assess the difficulties in
treatment decision making many patients diagnosed with anorexia
nervosa experience":...
[T]he participants' difficulties ... [in] mak[ing] treatment
decisions are poorly captured by the concept of capacity cur-
rently in use, which is based on understanding and reasoning.
Their difficulties extend beyond this to ... the ability to act in
terms of making choices. This ability to act can be affected by
the anorexia nervosa itself, which has a strong impact on the
patient's sense of needing to be in control of herself and the
prospect of losing control when accepting treatment. 70
Similar issues likely arise in assessing the competence of
schizophrenics and other psychotic patients. Just as disordered
perception about body size is a diagnostic symptom of eating
disorders, disordered experiential perception is a diagnostic symp-
tom of psychotic illness; once afflicted with these distorted percep-
tions, the "core person" may simply be "eclipsed by symptoms of the
167. Christopher G. Fairburn & Paul J. Harrison, Eating Disorders, 361 LANCET 407, 407
(2003).
168. GRISSO & APPELBAuM, MAcCAT-T, supra note 14, at 7-8.
169. Tan et al., Competence, supra note 125, at 699.
170. Tan et al., Control, supra note 158, at 642; see also Tan, The Anorexia Talking?, supra
note 166, at 1246 (concluding that for anorectic patients, "the paramount importance of being
thin ... devalue[s] other aspects of her life, such as relationships, education, and even life
itself. This new value system [may lead the patient to] ... decide that the risk of death is
preferable to the prospect of gaining weight.").
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disease.,' 17' However, like the anorectic patients who passed the
MacCAT-T with flying colors, mentally ill patients whose values
have been eclipsed by their illness may not express "any reason to
doubt" their diagnosis and may admit that the treatment "might be
of some benefit."'172
Consider the case of Ian Chovil, who has described on his website
many years of living with schizophrenia. Chovil says that his first
symptoms appeared during adolescence, and that he "was quite
strange from 16-25 ... [, but nonetheless] graduated [from college]
with [honors]."' After a brief hospitalization, Chovil began to suffer
from paranoid delusions. He was confident that "the CIA was after
[him] ... [and] Tibetan [B]uddhist lamas were reading [his] mind
everywhere [he] went.' 1 74 Chovil gradually 'los[t] contact with
reality," but he "never told anyone what was happening.'' Chovil
did not obtain psychiatric help until he was arrested and a judge
"realized [he] was a psychiatric case" and placed him on probation
for three years with a requirement that he see a psychiatrist during
that period.176 Chovil went to his appointments to stay out of jail,
but revealed nothing about his delusions: 'Psychiatrists are only
human ..., while I was almost alien and they wouldn't have under-
stood what was happening so I never told them anything."'177 Some
time later, during treatment for alcoholism, Chovil finally did begin
"a maintenance dose of anti-psychotics," but even with this aid, he
reports that "[i]t took several years to completely believe and
understand that I had schizophrenia.' 78
Chovil describes the same pattern of personal investment in
illness that seems to beset anorectic patients. Schizophrenics, he
reports from personal experience,
171. XAVIER AMADOR, I AM NOT SICK, I DON'T NEED HELP 147 (2d ed. 2007).
172. GRisso & APPELBAUM, MAcCAT-T, supra note 14, at 7-8.
173. Ian Chovil, The Experience of Schizophrenia, A Brief History, http://www.chovil.coml
story.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Frederick J. Frese III, Inside "Insight"--A Personal Perspective on Insight
in Psychosis, in INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 2d ed., supra note 92, at 356-57.
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may find it very difficult to lose their trust in these special
processes they are experiencing.... The process of losing trust in
something you have come to believe that is much more powerful
than you and especially interested in you is very painful, and
usually means very significant personal losses. Delusions and
hallucinations support you in the belief that you are very
special, and that powerful forces know you are very special, and
even on medication individuals will be very reluctant to give
that up.179
Fueled by these perceived benefits and underlying neuroanatomic
features of their disease, insight deficits in psychotic patients may
persist for years, just as they did in Chovil's case."' °
The evidence suggests that disordered insight may affect large
numbers of treatment decisions. In the United States alone, experts
estimate that there are six million individuals with serious mental
illnesses, half of whom do not believe they are ill and thus refuse to
follow through on treatment recommendations.8 1 Insight deficien-
cies are also a core symptom of dementia, and "[m]ore than five
million Americans have Alzheimer's Disease [alone], a ten percent
increase from the last official tally five years ago." ' 2 Insight deficits
are also common symptoms of substance abuse; they may occur in
victims of stroke and vascular accidents as well as brain injury.8 3
Of course, patients may fail to comply with treatment recommen-
dations or make decisions against treatment for reasons unrelated
to an insight disorder. We cannot simply assume, when a patient
who is suffering from a malady that causes disordered insight acts
against her medical interests, that it is the illness talking instead
of the patient. But if the patient has been medically assessed and
found to be afflicted with severely disordered insight, then it is
reasonable to assume that it is the coercive influence of illness, and
not the patient's authentic goals and values, that lead the patient
to favor continuation of her disease over her life and health.
179. Ian Chovil, Compliance, http://www.chovil.com/compliance.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2007).
180. See AMADOR, supra note 171, at 145-48 (recounting cases anecdotally).
181. See id. at 5.
182. Jane Gross, Prevalence of Alzheimer's Rises 10% in Five Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2007, at Al.
183. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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2. Depression and Hopelessness
Depression is a debilitating illness that impairs the health and
lives of its victims. Depression predicts future illness and premature
death."& It distorts thought and experience.18 It interferes with
virtually every aspect of daily life.'86
A rapidly growing body of research evidence also shows that
depression alters treatment preferences. A number of researchers
have studied patients' desires for "hastened death" in relation to
observable patient characteristics. Virtually all have reported a
strong correlation between major depression and such a desire.1 87 In
an early study, Harvey Chochinov and others found that, among a
group of terminally ill patients, those who were deeply depressed
were seven times more likely (58.8 percent versus 7.7 percent) to
184. See Linda Ganzini et al., Depression and Mortality in Medically Ill Older Adults, 45
J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 307, 310 (1997) (reporting that, among a group of medically but not
terminally ill older veterans, diagnosed depression significantly predicted survival thirty
months later); Stephen Kisely et al., Mortality in Individuals Who Have Had Psychiatric
Treatment: Population-Based Study in Nova Scotia, 187 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 552, 554
(2005) (explaining that depression increased mortality rates across the population); Lea C.
Watson et al., Depression in Assisted Living: Results from a Four-State Study, 11 AM. J.
GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 534, 539-40 (2003) (reporting that severely depressed residents of
long-term care facilities had a statistically significant increased rate of death and that
depression was significantly associated with medical comorbidity, social withdrawal,
psychosis, agitation, and length of residence in the facility, and finding that depressed
residents were discharged to nursing homes at 1.5 times the rate of nondepressed residents);
Depression and Heart Disease, HARv. HEART LETTER, Apr. 2001, at 1, 3-4 (reporting, for every
five-point increase in individual depression scores, a 15 percent increase in heart disease and
a 16 percent increase in mortality). See generally Kim T.J.L. Ensinck et al., Is There an
Increased Risk of Dying After Depression?, 156 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1043 (2002).
185. For a moving account of depression's impact, see generally WILLIAM STYRON, A
DARKNESS VISIBLE: A MEMOIR OF MADNESS (1990).
186. See Polly Hitchcock Noel et al., Depression and Comorbid Illness in Elderly Primary
Care Patients: Impact on Multiple Domains of Health Status and Well-Being, 2 ANNALS FAM.
MED. 555, 559 (2004) (reporting that depression severity was significantly associated with
four different indicators of general health after controlling for sociodemographic differences,
other psychological dysfunction, and the presence of eleven chronic medical conditions;
although study participants had an average of 3.8 chronic medical illnesses, depression
severity made a larger independent contribution than medical comorbidities to three of four
health indicators).
187. Major depression is generally defined as depressed mood or loss of interest in nearly
all activities for at least two weeks accompanied by at least five psychological or somatic
symptoms associated with depression. See John W. Williams, Jr. et al., Is This Patient
Clinically Depressed?, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1160, 1161 tbl.1 (2002) (citing DSM-IV).
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express a "serious and pervasive desire to die" than those who were
not depressed.'88 More recently, William Breitbart and colleagues
found that terminally ill cancer patients with symptoms of major
depression were four times more likely than patients without such
symptoms (47 percent versus 12 percent) to demonstrate "a high
desire for hastened death."'8 9 A large number of other U.S. surveys
have produced results similar to the Chochinov and Breitbart
findings. 9 °
The correlation between depression and a desire for hastened
death is not unique to the United States. Researchers have reported
188. See Harvey M. Chochinov et al., Desire for Death in the Terminally Ill, 152 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1185, 1187-88 (1995).
189. See William Breitbart et al., Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for Hastened Death
in Terminally Ill Patients with Cancer, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2907, 2910 (2000).
190. See M.A. Achille & J.R. Ogloff, Attitudes Toward and Desire for Assisted Suicide
Among Persons with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 48 OMEGA 1 (2003-04) (finding that
willingness to contemplate assisted suicide was associated with reports of elevated levels of
depressive symptoms and reports of hopelessness); William Breitbart et al., Interest in
Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Ambulatory HIV-Infected Patients, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
238, 241 (1996) (reporting that HIV-infected patients' interest in physician-assisted suicide
appeared to be more a function of psychological distress and social factors than physical
factors); Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia and
Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Terminally Ill Patients and Their Caregivers, 284 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 2460, 2460 (2000) (reporting that, among a group of 988 terminally ill patients,
factors associated with being more likely to consider euthanasia or PAS were depressive
symptoms, substantial caregiving needs, and pain, and that patients with depressive
symptoms and dyspnea were more likely to change their minds to consider euthanasia or PAS
than others); Kathleen Guentner, Preferences for Mechanical Ventilation Among Survivors of
Prolonged Mechanical Ventilation and Tracheostomy, 15 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 65, 72, 74
(2006) (reporting that patients who would not have chosen mechanical ventilation had more
depressive symptoms and were more likely to be insured by Medicare); Colleen S. McClain
et al., Effect of Spiritual Well-Being on End-of-Life Despair in Terminally-Ill Cancer Patients,
361 LANCET 1603, 1603 (2003) (reporting that "depression was highly correlated with desire
for hastened death in participants low in spiritual well-being, but not in those high in
spiritual well-being"); Diane E. Meier et al., Characteristics of Patients Requesting and
Receiving Physician-Assisted Death, 163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1537, 1538 (2003)
(reporting that nearly half of terminally ill patients who requested physician-assisted death
were depressed at the time of the request); see also Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Patients
with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and Their Caregivers Toward Assisted Suicide, 339 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 967, 971 (1998); Barry Rosenfeld et al., Measuring Desire for Death Among
Patients with HIV/AIDS: The Schedule of Attitudes Toward Hastened Death, 156 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 94, 98 (1999); Kenneth E. Rosenfeld et al., Factors Associated with Change in
Resuscitation Preference of Seriously Ill Patients, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1558, 1564
(1996); Keith G. Wilson et al., Attitudes of Terminally Ill Patients Toward Euthanasia and
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2454, 2458-59 (2000).
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similar results in Australia,'9 ' Greece, 192 Ireland,' 9 ' Japan,'94 and
the Netherlands.'95 The evidence thus suggests that depression
influences treatment choices independently of the cultural context
in which that choice is made. Despite occasional reports finding no
correlation between depression and interest in hastened death,
19 6
experts on end-of-life care have concluded that "for seriously ill
hospitalized patients, depressive mood plays a substantial role in
a patient's refusal of life-sustaining care .. Indeed, some
have urged that "strong consideration-or a low threshold-for a
psychiatric evaluation should be given when a patient expresses
interest in euthanasia or PAS."'98
191. B. Kelly et al., Factors Associated with the Wish To Hasten Death: A Study of Patients
with Terminal Illness, 33 PSYCHOL. MED. 75, 75, 79 (2003) (reporting that higher levels of
depressive symptoms, being admitted to an inpatient hospice, greater perception of being a
burden, lower family cohesion, lower social support, higher anxiety, and greater physical
symptoms were all related to a high interest in hastened death in a sample of terminally ill
cancer patients); David W. Kissane et al., Seven Deaths in Darwin Case Studies Under the
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, Northern Territory, Australia, 352 LANCET 1097, 1098, 1101
(1998).
192. See Kyriaki Mystakidou et al., Desire for Death Near the End of Life: The Role of
Depression, Anxiety and Pain, 27 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 256, 256 (2005) (reporting that
HADS-Depression scale, HADS-Anxiety scale, and interaction between HADS-Depression and
opioids were significant predictors of Schedule of Attitudes Toward Hastened Death (G-
SAHD) scores); see also Kyriaki Mystakidou et al., The Role of Physical and Psychological
Symptoms in Desire for Death: A Study of Terminally Ill Cancer Patients, 15 PSYCHO-
ONCOLOGY 355, 355, 358 (2005).
193. See Eoin Tiernan et al., Relations Between Desire for Early Death, Depressive
Symptoms, and Antidepressant Prescribing in Terminally Ill Patients with Cancer, 95 J.
ROYAL Soc. MED. 386, 387, 389-90 (2002) (reporting that desire for early death was
significantly correlated with depression scores).
194. See Tatsuo Akechi et al., Suicidality in Terminally Ill Japanese Patients with Cancer,
100 CANCER 183, 188 (2004) (reporting that self-reported anxiety and depression were
significantly associated with suicidal ideation among terminally ill cancer patients).
195. See Marije L. van der Lee et al., Euthanasia and Depression: A Prospective Cohort
Study Among Terminally Ill Cancer Patients, 23 J. CLINICAL ONCOLoGY 6607, 6609-11 (2005)
(finding, in a group of terminally ill cancer patients with a life expectancy of three months or
less, that the risk to requesting euthanasia was 4.1 times higher among patients with
depressed mood than among patients without depressed mood).
196. See Lewis M. Cohen et al., Depression and Suicidal Ideation in Patients Who
Discontinue the Life-Support Treatment of Dialysis, 64 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 889, 892-93
(2002); A. Srikumar Menon et al., Depression, Hopelessness, and the Desire for Life-Saving
Treatments Among Elderly Medically Ill Veterans, 8 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 333,339-40
(2000).
197. K. Rosenfeld et al., supra note 190, at 1564.
198. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Depression, Euthanasia, and Improving End-of-Life Care, 23 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 6456, 6457 (2005).
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The research evidence also shows that the link between depres-
sion and the desire for hastened death is not confined to the
terminally ill. Karen Blank and colleagues found that 15 percent of
ill, hospitalized patients who were depressed said that they desired
physician-assisted death, compared to only 1.1 percent of those who
did not suffer from depression.199 Another group of researchers who
studied the resuscitation preferences of patients with COPD, a
severe, life-threatening respiratory condition, found that "health-
related quality of life" was not significantly associated with those
preferences, but that depression was; only 23 percent of patients
without depression said that they would refuse resuscitation
treatment, compared to 50 percent of those with depression. °0
Among Alzheimer's Disease patients, depression, but not cognitive
impairment, is significantly correlated with interest in hastened
death.20 1 And in community surveys of the elderly, desire for death
is significantly correlated with depressive symptoms.
2 2
The research evidence also shows that depression's impact on
medical choice is not confined to decisions, like treatment refusal
and physician-assisted suicide, that will clearly hasten death.
Patients who are depressed are significantly less compliant with
medication and treatment recommendations; researchers have
199. Karen Blank et al., Life-Sustaining Treatment and Assisted Death Choices in
Depressed Older Patients, 49 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOCY 153, 155-56, 158 (2001); see also Ajit
Shah et al., Suicidal Ideation in Acutely Medically Ill Elderly Inpatients: Prevalence,
Correlates and Longitudinal Stability, 15 INT'L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 162, 166-67 (2000)
(reporting a significant correlation between suicidality scores and depression scores in
population of medically ill elderly hospital patients).
200. See Renee D. Stapleton et al., Association ofDepression and Life-Sustaining Treatment
Preferences in Patients with COPD, 127 CHEST 328, 329, 331 (2005). However, depression was
not significantly associated with preferences for mechanical ventilation. Id. at 331.
201. See Brian Draper et al., Suicidal Ideation and the 'Wish to Die' in Dementia Patients:
The Role of Depression, 27 AGE & AGEING 503 (1998).
202. See Michael E. Dewey et al., Expressed Wish To Die and Mortality in Older People: A
Community Replication, 22 AGE & AGEING 109 (1993); A.F. Jorm et al., Factors Associated
with the Wish To Die in Elderly People, 24 AGE & AGEING 389, 391 (1995).
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found that depressed patients with AIDS,20 3 asthma,20 4 diabetes, 205
and heart disease 206 are all less likely to follow their doctors' advice.
Indeed, one meta-analysis of twenty different studies concluded that
"the odds are 3 times greater that depressed patients will be
noncompliant with medical treatment recommendations. 2 7
Finally, the research evidence shows that treatment for depres-
sion often alters patients' medical choices. One group of researchers
assessed severely ill patients' resuscitation preferences at six-month
intervals. For patients whose depression scores improved by at least
one point between assessments, the adjusted probability of a change
in preference that favored resuscitation was 44 percent; for patients
whose depression scores worsened by at least one point, this
probability was only 8 percent: "In other words, for the one fifth of
patients with substantial changes in depression scores between
interviews, there was a greater than 5-fold difference in likelihood
of changing preference depending on direction of mood change .... 208
Another group of researchers treated a small group of terminally ill,
203. SeeAdrianaAmmassari et al., Depressive Symptoms, Neurocognitive Impairment, and
Adherence to Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy Among HIV-Infected Persons, 45
PSYCHOSOMATICS 394, 395, 398-99 (2004).
204. See Melissa Opolski & Ian Wilson, Asthma and Depression: A Pragmatic Review of the
Literature and Recommendations for Future Research, 1 CLINICAL PRAC. & EPIDEMIOLOGY
MENTAL HEALTH 18, 20-21 (2005).
205. See Iftekhar D. Kalsekar et al., Depression in Patients with Type 2 Diabetes: Impact
on Adherence to Oral Hypoglycemic Agents, 40 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 605, 605-06 (2006);
Amy M. Kilbourne et al., How Does Depression Influence Diabetes Medication Adherence in
Older Patients?, 13 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 202, 202-03, 207 (2005); Elizabeth H.B. Lin
et al., Relationship of Depression and Diabetes Self-Care, Medication Adherence, and
Preventive Care, 27 DIABETES CARE 2154, 2156-57 (2004); Patrick J. Lustman et al.,
Depression and Poor Glycemic Control, 23 DIABETES CARE 934, 940 (2000).
206. See Anil Gehi et al., Depression and Medication Adherence in Outpatients with
Coronary Heart Disease: Findings from the Heart and Soul Study, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 2508, 2511 (2005); Martje H.L. van der Wal et al., Compliance in Heart Failure Patients:
The Importance of Knowledge and Beliefs, 27 EUR. HEART J. 434, 436-37 (2006).
207. M. Robin DiMatteo et al., Depression Is a Risk Factor for Noncompliance with Medical
Treatment: Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Anxiety and Depression on Patient Adherence, 160
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2101, 2101 (2000) (reviewing studies); see also Isabella Jenkins et
al., Relationship of Psychiatric Diagnosis and Weight Loss Maintenance in Obese Breast
Cancer Survivors, 11 OBESITY RES. 1369, 1373 (2003). In one study, even symptoms of
maternal depression "were associated with a constellation of beliefs and attitudes that may
significantly influence adherence to [children's] asthma medications and illness." Susan J.
Bartlett et al., Maternal Depressive Symptoms and Adherence to Therapy in Inner-City
Children with Asthma, 113 PEDIATRICS 229, 229 (2004).
208. K. Rosenfeld et al., supra note 190, at 1561.
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suicidal cancer patients for major depression; after one week of
treatment, "five of the six patients showed a marked improvement
in their mood and showed no further suicidal thoughts or requests
for terminal sedation. 2 9 Among diabetics, "relief of depression is
associated with improved glycemic control."21 Adherence to
prescribed treatment for depression is associated with significantly
increased adherence to prescribed treatments for other illnesses.21'
If depression is strongly associated with particular medical
choices and treatment for depression tends to alter those choices,
then it seems likely that many of the medical decisions made by
depressed patients are not authentic, autonomous choices. Instead,
it seems likely that depression acts as a coercive influence that
interferes with the patient's capacity to recognize her genuine
treatment preferences.
The research evidence shows that depression does not typically
coerce treatment preferences by interfering with the capacity to
communicate, understand risk-related information, and rationally
process information, however. The vast majority of depressed
patients thus can pass standard competence tests. For example,
209. See Akira Kugaya et al., Successful Antidepressant Treatment for Five Terminally Ill
Cancer Patients with Major Depression, Suicidal Ideation and a Desire for Death, 6
SUPPORTIVE CANCER CARE 432, 432 (1999); see also Linda Ganzini et al., The Effect of
Depression Treatment on Elderly Patients'Preferences for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 151 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1631, 1635, 1636 (1995) (explaining that remission of depression resulted in
an increase in desire for life-sustaining medical therapy in subjects who had been initially
rated as more severely depressed, more hopeless, and more likely to overestimate the risks
and to underestimate the benefits of treatment, but not in those suffering from milder
depression); Stuart C. Hooper et al., Major Depression and Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment in the Elderly, 165 MED. J. AUSTL. 416, 418 (1996); Melinda Lee & Linda Ganzini,
The Effect of Recovery from Depression on Preferences for Life-Sustaining Therapy in Older
Patients, 49 J. GERONTOLOGY M15, M15 (1994) (finding that treatment of mild to moderate
depression did not alter treatment preferences); Sean O2Mahony et al., Desire for Hastened
Death, Cancer Pain and Depression: Report of a Longitudinal Observational Study, 29 J. PAIN
& SYMPTOM MGMT. 446,447 (2005) (reporting that "improvement in depression moderated the
severity of desire for hastened death in a population of patients with cancer pain ... [while]
[i]mprovementi in functional impairment due to pain did not ...").
210. See Ryan J. Anderson et al., The Prevalence of Comorbid Depression in Adults with
Diabetes: A Meta-Analysis, 24 DIABETES CARE 1069, 1069 (2001) (reviewing studies); see also
Lustman et al., supra note 205 (reviewing twenty-four studies examining the relationship
between depression and glycemic control and concluding that depression was a highly
significant correlate of hyperglycemia, the result of failure to control glycemic levels).
211. See DiMatteo, supra note 207 (reviewing studies); Wayne Katon et al., Impact of
Antidepressant Drug Adherence on Comorbid Medication Use and Resource Utilization, 165
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2497, 2497 (2005) (reviewing studies).
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among ninety-two clinically depressed survey participants who took
the MacCAT-T, only 12 percent scored in the "impaired" range on
"appreciation," 5 percent on "understanding," and 8 percent on
"reasoning." '212 In another survey, "[a]lmost all [clinically depressed]
subjects performed quite well on the capacity measures and
maintained that level of performance over time. There was no
correlation between performance and degree of depressive symp-
toms ....,213
Experts thus suggest that depression's impact on health-care
decision making is irrational and that several different pathways
may be involved:
[One] depressed patient, convinced that his situation will never
change, may refuse treatment based on the unrealistic belief
that it will not help him.... [A] slightly different sort of depressed
patient ... [may] not [be] motivated to take ... risks into account
in the same way as the rest of us.... [And s]ome patients, as a
result of their depression, may even want to take risks. Roth et
al wonder about the competence of one such patient, a 49-year-
old woman capable of fully understanding the electroconvulsive
therapy for which she was being asked to consent, but who,
when told that electroconvulsive therapy carried a 1 in 3000
chance of death, replied, "I hope I am the one. 214
212. See Berg et al., supra note 10, at 372 n.91.
213. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Competence of Depressed Patients for Consent To Research,
156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1380, 1380 (1999).
214. Carl Elliott, Caring About Risks: Are Severely Depressed Patients Competent to
Consent To Research?, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 113 (1997); see also Harold J. Bursztajn
et al., Beyond Cognition: The Role of Disordered Affective States in Impairing Competence To
Consent to Treatment, 19 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 383, 383 (1991) (finding that
"patients with major affective disorders can retain the cognitive capacity to understand the
risks and benefits of a medication, yet fail to appreciate its benefits"); Grimes et al., supra note
113, at 1564 (reporting that "[v]oluntariness also may be diminished by apathy, as when
patients with depression feel hopeless and do not care what is done to them. Some patients
may even make choices contrary to their values and 'nondepressed' desires, out of a feeling
that they are guilty and deserve punishment."); Mark D. Sullivan & Stuart J. Youngner,
Depression, Competence, and the Right To Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 151 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 971, 971 (1994).
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Depression alters the context in which decisions are made: it can
magnify pain,215 impair coping capacity,216 and contribute to the loss
of functional ability.217
Depression can also induce feelings of hopelessness. Indeed,
"hopelessness is [now] widely recognized to be a cardinal symptom
of major depression, 218 and in elderly patients it may be a more
reliable indicator of major depressive illness than depressed
mood. Hopelessness is a powerful predictor of suicide; in one
prospective study of psychiatric outpatients, a score of nine or
higher on the Beck Hopelessness Scale identified sixteen (94.2
percent) of the seventeen patients who eventually committed
suicide. 219 Hopelessness is also a powerful predictor of interest in
hastened death. In a survey of older, medically ill patients in the
care of a Veterans Administration hospital, "[s]ubjects with high
levels of hopelessness ... were at least five times more likely to
refuse CPR if required during the[ir] current hospitalization., 221
Another group of researchers found that:
Among patients who were neither depressed nor hopeless, none
had a high desire for hastened death, whereas approximately
one fourth of the patients with either of one of these factors had
a high desire for hastened death, and nearly two-thirds of
215. See G. Magni et al., Prospective Study on the Relationship Between Depressive
Symptoms and Chronic Musculoskeletal Pain, 56 PAIN 289, 294-96 (1994).
216. See C. Dickens & F. Creed, The Burden of Depression in Patients with Rheumatoid
Arthritis, 40 RHEUMATOLOGY 1327, 1327-28 (2001).
217. See P.P. Katz & E.H. Yelin, Prevalence and Correlates of Depressive Symptoms Among
Persons with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 20 J. RHEUMATOLOGY 790, 794-95 (1993); Daniel
Weintraub et al., Effect of Psychiatric and Other Nonmotor Symptoms on Disability in
Parkinson's Disease, 52 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 784, 784 (2004); see also N.J. Rubin, Severe
Asthma and Depression, 2 ARCHIvES FAM. MED. 26 (1993) (reporting that asthma and
depression "are thought to interact to worsen both conditions, especially at the severe end of
the spectrum of disease").
218. Mark D. Sullivan, Hope and Hopelessness at the End of Life, 11 AM. J. GERIATRIC
PSYCHIATRY 393, 396 (2003); see also Harvey Max Chochinov, Dying, Dignity, and New
Horizons in Palliative, End.of-Life Care, 56 CA 84, 84 (2006).
219. See Aaron T. Beck et al., Relationship Between Hopelessness and Ultimate Suicide: A
Replication with Psychiatric Outpatients, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 190, 190 (1990). Similar
results have been obtained with psychiatric inpatients. See Aaron T. Beck et al., Hopelessness
and Eventual Suicide: A 10-Year Prospective Study of Patients Hospitalized with Suicidal
Ideation, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 559, 561 (1985).
220. See Menon et al., supra note 196, at 333.
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patients with both depression and hopelessness had high desire
for hastened death.2 2'
And although one might expect that severe illness would often
produce hopelessness, neither disease severity nor prognosis are
useful predictors of hopelessness and suicidal ideation.222
In sum, major depression has the capacity to dramatically
diminish the quality of daily life and to plunge its victim into a
hopeless state in which he loses all faith in the future. Depression's
effects may be irrational, but they are nonetheless real and, for
some patients, they appear to overcome the desire for life and health
and to coerce decisions against the patient's medical interests.
Large numbers of patient choices may be affected by depression's
strong but irrational grip. Surveys show that perhaps one-quarter
of patients with type 2 diabetes,223 13-20 percent of those with
rheumatoid arthritis, 224 13 percent of those in assisted living
facilities, 25 a third of those with diagnosed Alzheimer's Disease,
26
221. Breitbart et al., supra note 189, at 2910; see also Harvey Max Chochinov et al.,
Depression, Hopelessness, and Suicidal Ideation in the Terminally Ill, 39 PSYCHOSOMATICS
366,366 (1998) (finding that among a group of terminally ill cancer patients, hopelessness was
a better predictor of suicidal ideation than depression); Ganzini et al., supra note 190, at 967;
Wilson et al., supra note 190, at 2454.
222. See M. Lloyd-Williams & T. Friedman, Depression in Palliative Care Patients-A
Prospective Study, 10 EUR. J. CANCER CARE 270,270 (2001) (finding, among patients receiving
palliative care only for advanced metastatic cancer, that the incidence of depression according
to International Classification of Diseases criteria was 22 percent); Stefan C. Weiss,
Understanding the Experience of Pain in Terminally Ill Patients, 357 LANCET 1311, 1312
(2001) (finding that 17 percent of all surveyed terminally ill patients and 22 percent of those
in pain were clinically depressed); see also Chochinov et al., supra note 221; Sullivan, supra
note 218.
223. See Thaddeus J. Kuszmar et al., Suicide and Prevention in High-Risk Hospitalized
Populations, 25 PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT 21 (2001).
224. See Dickens & Creed, supra note 216, at 1327.
225. See Watson et al., supra note 184, at 534 (using the Cornell Scale for Depression in
Dementia (CSDD), 13 percent of surveyed residents were depressed and more than "one-third
of residents had symptoms of depression, such as anxious expression, rumination, or
worrying, and 25% displayed sad voice, sad expression, or tearfulness"); see also Harold G.
Koenig et al., Major Depressive Disorder in Hospitalized Medically Ill Patients: An
Examination of Young and Elderly Male Veterans, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 881,886 (1991)
(reporting major depressive disorder in 22 percent of medically ill, hospitalized male veterans
under forty and 13 percent of those seventy or over).
226. See George S. Zubenko et al., A Collaborative Study of the Emergence and Clinical
Features of the Major Depressive Syndrome of Alzheimer's Disease, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 857,
857, 860 (2003) (reporting "common emergence in the early stages of dementia when
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227
and more than 60 percent of those recovering from a stroke, are
depressed. Just as depression increases the risk that an illness will
be experienced as particularly severe and debilitating, the chal-
lenges and stress of a chronic illness increase the risk of both
depression228 and suicidality.229
Moreover, although the efficacy of treatment for depression has
been shown again and again,230 substantial numbers of patients
with clinically detectible moderate or severe depression are not
accurately diagnosed and thus do not obtain appropriate medica-
tions. For example, in one survey of cancer patients, only 40 percent
of patients with moderate or severe depression were receiving
antidepressants.2 31 In another survey of patients in long-term care
facilities, only 18 percent of those determined to be depressed were
receiving medication.21 2 And as many as two-thirds of the patients
symptoms of cognitive impairment are least likely to contribute to the syndromal diagnosis
of major depression" and suggesting high prevalence of depression in patients with other
forms of dementia).
227. See P. Angelelli et al., Development of Neuropsychiatric Symptoms in Poststroke
Patients: A Cross-Sectional Study, 110 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVIAN 55, 55 (2004)
(reporting that 61 percent of a post-stroke population were depressed and that greater
depression "evolved in the year following stroke").
228. See Linnea Haarasilta et al., Major Depressive Episode and Physical Health in
Adolescents and Young Adults: Results from a Population-Based Inverview Survey, 15 EUR.
J. PUB. HEALTH 489, 489 (2005); Deborah J. Wexler, Low Risk of Depression in Diabetes?
Would That It Were So, 175 CAN. J. MED. 47, 47-48 (2006).
229. See Benjamin Druss & Harold Pincus, Suicidal Ideation and Suicide Attempts in
General Medical Illnesses, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1522, 1522 (2000) (reporting that in
a large national survey, 16.3 percent of all respondents, 25.2 percent of those with a general
medical condition, and 35 percent of those with two or more medical illnesses reported
lifetime suicidal ideation; 5.5 percent of all respondents, 8.9 percent of those with a general
medical illness, and 16.2 percent of those with two or more medical conditions reported a
suicide attempt. "Cancer and asthma were each associated with a more than 4-fold increase
in the likelihood of a suicide attempt."); Bruce L. Rolman & M. Katherine Shear, Depression
and Medical Comorbidity: Red Flags for Current Suicidal Ideation in Primary Care, 65
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 506, 506-07 (2003) (summarizing data); see also Stephen E. Bartels et
al., Suicidal and Death Ideation in Older Primary Care Patients with Depression, Anxiety, and
At-Risk Alcohol Use, 10 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 417, 417 (2002).
230. See, e.g., Linda H. Harpole et al., Improving Depression Outcomes in Older Adults with
Comorbid Medical Illness, 27 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 4, 4 (2005) (finding, among a large
sample of depressed patients suffering from an average of 3.8 chronic medical conditions, that
"the number of chronic diseases did not affect the likelihood of response to ... intervention,"
and "[i]ntervention patients experienced significantly lower depression during all follow-up
time points ... ").
231. See O'Mahony et al., supra note 209, at 446.
232. See Watson et al., supra note 184, at 534.
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who commit suicide-the vast majority of whom are thought to be
severely depressed-have seen a physician in the month before their
deaths.3
Of course, the wish for hastened death, treatment noncompliance,
and decisions against treatment may arise independently of
depression. We cannot assume that every patient who makes a
decision against her medical interests is depressed or that treat-
ment for depression will invariably change the patient's mind.234
However, we can assume that untreated major depression poses a
very high risk of unduly influencing treatment preferences and
rendering them inauthentic.
III. A NEW APPROACH TO MEDICAL DECISION MAKING: ASSESSING
COMPETENCE PLUS COERCION
A. The Law of Wills as a Model for Reform
The evidence shows that patients suffering from major depression
or disordered insight frequently make treatment choices that pose
serious risks to life and health. The evidence also shows that these
risky treatment choices are typically involuntary; they represent the
coercive influence of illness instead of the goals and values of the
patient herself. Once the coercive influence of illness has been
removed, patients rarely ratify decisions against their medical
interests. Instead, they express relief that medical professionals
refused to heed the voice of their disease.
Legal standards for assessing patient competence are inadequate
to reveal the coercive influence of depression and disordered insight.
Because these standards assess only the patient's knowledge of
233. See Rollman & Shear, supra note 229, at 506; see also Simeon Margolis & Karen L.
Swartz, Depression and Anxiety (Johns Hopkins White Papers 2000) ("50 to 70% of U.S.
suicides are due to depression, and 15% of severely depressed people commit suicide.").
234. See, e.g., Janet A. Butler et al., Modifiable Risk Factors for Non-Adherence to
Immunosuppressants in Renal Transplant Recipients: A Cross-Sectional Study, 19
NEPHROLOGY DIALYsIS TRANSPLANTATION 3144, 3144 (2004) (finding that "[l]ower belief in the
need for medication and having a transplant from a live donor were the major factors
associated with non-adherence [to immunosuppressants]. Depression was common, although
not strongly associated with non-adherence."); Cohen et al., supra note 196, at 889 (reporting
that, within a sample of seventy-nine dialysis patients, depression was not significantly
associated with decisions to discontinue dialysis).
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her illness, they often fail to reveal disordered perceptions and
typically fail to take the motivational effects of disease-induced
misperceptions into account. Because these standards assess only
cognitive ability, they ignore depression's corrosive emotional
impact on free agency altogether.
In sum, the law of medical decision making is inadequate to
protect patients from the risks associated with illness-induced
choices against medical interests. Current legal standards ensure
that the patient is competent to make a medical decision, but they
do not ensure that the patient's choice is authentic and voluntary.
Current standards thus should be reformed to provide protection
against coercion equivalent to that offered by other areas of law.
The law of wills offers an excellent model for needed reforms.
First, the law of wills is responsive to goals extraordinarily similar
to those underlying the law of medical decision making: Both
areas of law are centrally concerned with effectuating autonomous
individual choices on matters of considerable importance to the
individual actor. Both areas of law treat unilateral decisions instead
of bilateral agreements. Reflecting the unilateral character of the
decisions at stake, in both areas of law there is consensus that the
public interests in the actor's decision are outweighed by the
individual interests of the decision maker.
Second, the law of wills has developed volitional doctrines that
are readily adaptable to the medical decision-making context. The
insane-delusion doctrine is aimed at uncovering distorted percep-
tions and beliefs that coerce a testator's bequests.235 This doctrine,
modified for the medical decision-making context, would seem to be
an ideal vehicle for protecting patients suffering from disordered
insight; after all, distorted perceptions and beliefs are key features
of insight deficiencies. The undue-influence doctrine is aimed more
generally at uncovering bequests to individuals who exert coercive
pressure and thus overpower the testator's own preferences in favor
of more obvious beneficiaries like close family members.236 This
doctrine, again modified for the medical decision-making context,
would seem to be an excellent vehicle for protecting patients
suffering from the corrosive emotional influence exerted by depres-
sion and hopelessness; these emotional conditions poison the minds
235. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 52-53, 58 and accompanying text.
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of their victims against natural interests in life and health just as
a scheming confidante poisons her victim's mind against relatives
who are the natural objects of her bounty.
Finally, because neither the undue-influence nor insane-delusion
doctrines are available when a testator makes a decision that
comports with typical testamentary preferences,3 7 adapted doc-
trines would naturally screen out only those medical decisions that
pose serious risks to the patient's life or health. Use of these
adapted doctrines thus should cure the parsimonious model's failure
to protect nonautonomous actors from disease-induced choices that
conflict with the patient's authentic values and medical interests
without any efficiency loss.
The Candura decision described in Part I offers an excellent
vehicle for demonstrating how this new approach would work. In
its evaluation of the evidence, the Candura appellate court was
exclusively concerned with determining whether the patient
understood the risks and benefits inherent in the treatment choice;
once the evidence showed that Mrs. Candura knew that her refusal
to consent to surgery on her gangrenous leg would likely lead to her
death, the court was satisfied that she was competent to make that
decision.238
The new approach would require both the initial decision maker,
in this case the investigating psychiatrist, and the appellate court
to go beyond an assessment of Mrs. Candura's legal competence;
these actors would additionally assess the possibility that Mrs.
Candura's decision was coerced by disordered insight or major
depression. The Candura opinion does not reveal any formal
assessment of either depression or disordered insight.2"9 It is thus
difficult to determine, at this distance, just what the evidence would
have shown.
However, we do know that diabetics like Mrs. Candura are at
relatively high risk of depressive illness. Surveys show that about
one-quarter of patients with type 2 diabetes are depressed, a rate
higher than that reported in some surveys of the terminally ill.24° As
237. See In re Kamesar, 259 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Wis. 1977).
238. See Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1234-35 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); see also supra
notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
239. Candura, 376 N.E.2d at 1234-36 (detailing Candura's treatment with no indication
of a depression or disordered insight screening).
240. See Kuszmar et al., supra note 223; supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
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it does in other treatment contexts, depression also appears to have
a major impact on diabetics' treatment choices and behaviors.
Depressed diabetics are less compliant with dietary and medication
directions than are other patients; as a result, they are at higher
risk of uncontrolled glucose levels.241 One meta-analysis of twenty-
four studies examining the relationship between depression and
glycemic control in diabetics thus found that depression was a
highly significant correlate of hyperglycemia, which can accelerate
the development of vascular complications.242 Vascular complica-
tions cause gangrene, the condition for which Mrs. Candura was
admitted to the hospital.243 And depression that is "comorbid with
vascular disorders ... is [often] accompanied by lesions in the basal
ganglia and prefrontal areas of the brain."244 Perhaps as a result of
these lesions, "depression in patients with vascular disease is often
characterized by motor retardation, lack of insight, and impairment
of executive functions. 245
It is thus plausible-perhaps probable-that Mrs. Candura was
afflicted with major depression, disordered insight, or both. Under
the wills-based approach to patient decision making that I have
outlined, the psychiatrists who examined Mrs. Candura would have
formally assessed the extent to which Mrs. Candura was depressed
and tested her for disordered insight. If this assessment revealed
either major depression or a serious insight disorder, Mrs. Candura
would not be allowed to make a decision that would result in her
death. Instead, the law would protect her from the coercive influ-
ence of her.illness.
Just as it is impossible to assess coercive influences that may
have afflicted Mrs. Candura in retrospect, it is also impossible to
assess the possibility of coercion in the other reported decisions
described in Part I. However, there appears to be a high probability
241. See Kuszmar et al., supra note 223.
242. Lustman et al., supra note 205, at 939. Severe depressive symptoms significantly
correlate with mortality risk among diabetics; depression's impact on diabetics also appears
to be greater than it is on other individuals. See Xuanping Zhang et al., Depressive Symptoms
and Mortality Among Persons With and Without Diabetes, 161 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 652, 654
(2005). Medication noncompliance may be an explanatory factor.
243. Candura, 376 N.E.2d at 1234.
244. Barry D. Lebowitz et al., Diagnosis and Treatment of Depression in Late Life:
Consensus Statement Update, 278 JAMA 1186, 1187 (1997).
245. Id.
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of coercion in each of these cases. Quackenbush, the court tells us,
was suffering from an "organic brain syndrome,' ' 46 Bergstedt was
"despair[ing],' 2 47 and Bouvia, the petitioner hospital maintained,
was very depressed.2 4' There is also a strong likelihood that the
lucid suicide victim described in Part 1249 was depressed or insight-
deficient: survey data show that more than 90 percent of suicide
victims have a psychiatric illness identified in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IVM, most frequently
depression, substance abuse, or both; bipolar disorder and schizo-
phrenia are also both significantly linked with suicidality.25 °
Moreover, experts have concluded that "the overwhelming majority
of people who desire to kill themselves at one time will feel very
different after improvement in their depression or after receiving
help with other problems."251
Under the wills-based approach that I have outlined, formal
assessment of disordered insight and depression would be required
for each of these patients. If a coercive condition were found, the law
would protect the patient from that influence by ordering medically
indicated treatment.
The wills-based approach would not require assessment of
coercive influences in all cases, of course. No assessment would be
required if the patient made a decision in favor of a medically
recommended treatment, if the patient decided against an ex-
tremely risky medical treatment, or if the patient chose to forgo a
treatment offering minimal or uncertain benefits. Nor would
coercion assessment be appropriate in cases where natural variation
in risk aversion and personal values would likely produce frequent
disagreement among autonomous decision makers. Thus the patient
who decided to forgo painful and tiring treatment for pancreatic
246. In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785, 788 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978); see supra notes 26-30
and accompanying text.
247. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990); see supra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text.
248. See GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 261; see supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text.
249. See Hassan et al., supra note 38, at 107.
250. See Robert M.A. Hirschfeld & James M. Russell, Assessment and Treatment of
Suicidal Patients, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 910, 911 (1997); J. John Mann et al., Suicide
Prevention Strategies: A Systematic Review, 294 JAMA 2064, 2065 (2005).
251. Hirschfeld & Russell, supra note 250, at 914.
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cancer, an almost invariably fatal disease," 2 should not be assessed;
nor should the patient who decided against a risky bone marrow
transplant, or the patient who concluded that she would rather
reduce her high cholesterol level through dietary change instead of
a recommended medication.
On the other hand, if the proposed treatment offers a good chance
of curing or significantly improving a serious and debilitating
medical condition, then assessment of coercive influence is war-
ranted. The patient who refused anti-psychotic drug treatment for
schizophrenia should certainly be assessed, as should the patient
who opted against treatment for glaucoma and the patient who
refused surgery that offered a high probability of restoring or
preserving mobility.253
If assessment shows the existence of coercion induced by depres-
sion or disordered insight, a guardian would be appointed to make
treatment decisions on the patient's behalf. Just as in the case of an
incompetent patient, the guardian would continue in this role until
examination revealed that the coercive influence has been removed.
The guardian would be charged with making decisions in the best
interests of the patient and would have decision-making authority
with respect to all aspects of the patient's medical care. Although
constitutional doctrine and state law disallow commitment of a
mental patient to a psychiatric treatment facility without a showing
of danger to the patient or others,254 the guardian should be
empowered to consent to all other forms of treatment, including so-
252. See Jill P. Smith et al., Drug Retention and Distribution After Intratumoral
Chemotherapy with Fluorouracil/Epinephrine Injectable Gel in Human Pancreatic Cancer
Xenografts, 44 CANCER CHEMOTHERAPY PHARMACOLOGY 267, 267 (1999).
253. Decisions respecting participation in research trials present more difficult issues that
are beyond the scope of this Article. Research-trial participation sometimes offers the
possibility of direct therapeutic benefit, and sometimes it does not. The risks of participation
may be minimal, large, or unknown. Certainly, when research risks are minimal, the
assessment of coercive influences is unnecessary; certainly, when the risks are large and
potential benefit unclear, assessment of coercive influence is necessary. Many research trials
will not fall into one of these two clear-cut categories, however.
254. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (requiring clear and convincing
evidence of danger to self or others); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975)
(holding that the state could not constitutionally confine a nondangerous individual). State
commitment requirements and procedures now conform to the O'Connor.Addington
requirements. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 94 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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called "outpatient commitment," involving mandated medication
checks but no loss of liberty. 5
B. Matters of Measurement
Ideally, we would have a simple, widely accepted, and standard-
ized assessment procedure that, with a very high degree of accuracy,
would classify patient decisions as coerced, due to major depression
or insight impairment, or voluntary. We do not, at this point, have
such an instrument.
Although law reform of the sort I have described will undoubtedly
spur the development of assessment procedures aimed specifically
at the coercive effects of depression and insight impairment, today's
diagnosticians will need to rely on assessment protocols aimed more
generally at determining levels of insight impairment and depres-
sion. These protocols typically produce incremental scores instead
of either/or conclusions. They also vary enormously in length and
complexity. For example, depression can be measured with a one-
question or thirty-question inventory.256 Insight scales range from
the seventy-four-item SUMD to the one-item Present State Exam
(PSE).257
Adding complexity, the various scales do not all measure the
same variables. Thus the SUMD fails to assess the patient's
perceived need for treatment, while some other insight-measure-
ment scales fail to assess awareness of treatment benefits, aware-
ness of signs and symptoms of the relevant disorder, or attribution
255. See Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with
Serious Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L.
REv. 1269, 1291 (2000) (describing and advocating outpatient commitment schemes). Some
state laws require a showing that the patient poses a danger to self or others as a precondition
to outpatient as well as inpatient commitment. See id. at 1290-91, 1297. These statutes should
be liberally interpreted to include danger to self as a result of medication noncompliance;
because outpatient commitment involves no significant loss of liberty, a dangerousness
requirement would not appear to be constitutionally mandated. Id. at 1299.
256. See Jagannadha R. Avasarala et al., Comparative Assessment of Yale Single Question
and Beck Depression Inventory Scale in Screening for Depression in Multiple Sclerosis, 9
MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS 307,308 (2003) (comparing single and twenty-one-item scales); A. John
Rush et al., Comparison of Self-Report and Clinician Ratings on Two Inventories of Depressive
Symptomatology, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 829,829 (2006) (comparing thirty-item Inventory
of Depressive Symptomology and sixteen-item Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomology).
257. See Amador & Kronengold, supra note 107, at 10 tbl.1.1 (comparing insight-
assessment tools by number of items).
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of signs and symptoms to having a particular disorder.258 Depression
scales, too, vary in their focus. For example, the widely used
Hamilton Depression Scale deviates from official DSM-IV criteria
for assessing symptoms associated with depression.259 Again adding
complexity, some of the diagnostic symptoms associated with
depression-for example, loss of appetite and fatigue-are also
associated with physical illness.26 ° It may not always be obvious
whether the patient's symptom is due to his disease, depression, or
both. 6
1
Despite these various difficulties, many rating scales produce
highly consistent results when used by experienced clinicians.262
There is also a depression-assessment procedure (DISH), specifically
"designed to minimize respondent burden without sacrificing the
thoroughness or accuracy of the interview," that that has been
developed for medically ill patients.263 In a comparative survey,
interviewers utilizing this procedure produced results that corre-
sponded closely with longer and more detailed assessment
protocols.2" And researchers are working on disease-specific
depression-assessment tools to improve categorization of ambiguous
symptoms.265 In a close or difficult case, clinicians searching for
coercive insight impairment or depression might need to use more
than one assessment protocol to ensure accurate results.
Of course, the length and complexity of assessment procedures
must take account of the patient's underlying condition; in emer-
258. See id. at 13 tbl.1.2 (showing dimensions of insight assessed in various assessment
tools).
259. See R. Michael Bagby et al., The Hamilton Depression Rating Scale: Has the Gold
Standard Become a Lead Weight?, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2163, 2170 (2004) (concluding that
"[s]everal symptoms contained within the Hamilton depression scale are not official DSM
diagnostic criteria, although they are recognized as features associated with depression (e.g.,
psychic anxiety).... More critically, important features of DSM-IV depression are often buried
within more complex items and sometimes are not captured at all.").
260. See Williams et al., supra note 187, at 1161 tbl.1 (citing DSM-IV).
261. See id. at 1160.
262. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
263. Kenneth E. Freedland et al., The Depression Interview and Structured Hamilton
(DISH): Rationale, Development, Characteristics, and Clinical Validity, 64 PSYCHOSOMATIC
MED. 897, 897 (2002).
264. See id. at 902.
265. See, e.g., Avasarala et al., supra note 256, at 307; Anette Schrag et al., Depression
Rating Scales in Parkinson's Disease: Critique and Recommendations, 22 MOVEMENT
DISORDERS 1077, 1077 (2007).
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gency situations, a thorough assessment will often be impossible.266
Consider, once again, the case of the suicide victim who rejects
treatment in the emergency room.267 If full evaluation is medically
inappropriate, the physician should rely on minimal screening
tools: there is a two-question depression screen that, even in an
emergency-room setting, produces results fairly consistent with
those produced by more detailed assessment tools; 26 there is also a
two-question insight-assessment tool for emergency use.269 If
evaluation produces equivocal results, the strong correlation
between a suicide attempt and serious psychiatric illness justifies
a presumption of coercive influence °.2 " Thus only clear evidence that
the patient's suicide attempt was genuinely voluntary should justify
acceding to a suicidal patient's nontreatment request.
In sum, although a standardized, consensus procedure for
assessing the coercive influence of depression and disordered insight
is not yet available, existing assessment tools are adequate to
determine whether a patient's choice is determined by her own goals
and values or by her illness. Multiple forms of assessment may
sometimes be necessary. Emergency situations may require
reliance, at least initially, on partial assessment or presumption. If
screening for coercion becomes commonplace, however, it is likely
that standardized, streamlined assessment protocols will become
available.
CONCLUSION
The current law of medical decision making fails to protect
vulnerable patients whose free agency has been lost to the empire
of illness. A large and growing body of evidence shows that disor-
dered insight and major depression, two common medical condi-
266. See Freedland et al., supra note 263, at 901 (indicating that the minimized DISH
depression-assessment procedure required, for patients ultimately diagnosed as having major
depression, more than an hour to conduct).
267. See Hassan et al., supra note 38, at 107.
268. See F.M. Hustey, The Use of a Brief Depression Screen in Older Emergency Department
Patients, 12 AcAD. EMERGENCY MED. 905, 906-07 (2005); E.G. Scott et al., Screening for
Adolescent Depression in a Pediatric Emergency Department, 13 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 537,
540-41 (2006).
269. See Amador & Kronengold, supra note 107, at 10 tbl.1.1.
270. See supra notes 221-22.
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tions, often have a large and negative effect on treatment choice and
compliance. When patients are afflicted with disordered insight or
major depression, a decision against treatment thus is likely to
represent the illness talking instead of the patient.
The undue-influence and insane-delusion doctrines developed
within the law of wills to detect and disarm coercive influences are
readily adaptable to the medical decision-making context. There is
a wealth of assessment protocols that offer reliable methods of
detecting the influence of depression and insight deficits. The same
clinicians who today assess competence alone thus could easily
assess coercive influences as well.
Vulnerable patients need, and deserve, protection from the
coercive effects of distorted perception and motivation just as much
as vulnerable testators need and deserve protection against
scheming gold-diggers. It is time to reform the law of medical
decision making to ensure that it provides such protection. Patient
health-and life itself-hang in the balance.

